State v. Victor L. Pixley
200 A.3d 174
Vt.2018Background
- Defendant (Pixley) was convicted by a jury of unlawful trespass under 13 V.S.A. § 3705(a) after police found him inside a vacant, boarded farmhouse that the owner was trying to sell.
- Property trustee testified the house was vacant, had multiple posted no‑trespass signs (door, driveway, barn) and a light aimed at the front‑door sign; she did not know or give permission to defendant to be there.
- Police observed yellow posted private‑property signs and found defendant inside the house with another man.
- Defendant, who is homeless, testified he entered at night seeking a place to sleep, claimed he did not see the signs and cannot read, and conceded he had no permission to be on the property.
- At a charge conference defense counsel participated in drafting the notice instruction and the court ultimately instructed the jury that notice may be proven by signs "designated and situated as to give reasonable notice." No contemporaneous objection was made to the jury charge. The jury returned a guilty verdict.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the notice element of § 3705(a) requires subjective actual notice (that defendant saw and understood posted signs) | The State argued notice can be proven objectively by signs "designated and situated" to give reasonable notice | Pixley argued the State must prove he subjectively received notice (saw/understood signs) to satisfy the mens rea | The court held the statute permits objective proof of notice by signage reasonably situated; subjective receipt of signs is not required |
| Whether the jury instruction improperly compelled a finding that defendant received notice | The State maintained the instruction accurately reflected statutory options for notice (actual communication or reasonable signage) | Pixley claimed the instruction effectively directed the jury to find he received notice | The court found the instruction, read as a whole, accurately described the law and did not direct a required finding of receipt |
| Whether the license and notice elements are conflated such that Fanger controls notice mens rea | State contended Fanger addresses only the license/privilege element, not signage notice | Pixley relied on Fanger to argue all trespass mens rea must be subjective | The court distinguished Fanger (license element subjective) from the separate notice element, which the statute treats objectively when proven by signage |
| Whether the unpreserved instructional claim warrants plain‑error reversal | State argued no plain error because instructions were correct and not misleading | Pixley argued the instruction was plain error affecting his constitutional rights | The court applied plain‑error review and concluded no plain error; instructions were legally correct and did not undermine confidence in the verdict |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Fanger, 665 A.2d 36 (1995) (trespass license element requires subjective knowledge)
- State v. Jackowski, 915 A.2d 767 (2006) (jury instructions upheld when considered as a whole)
- State v. Stell, 937 A.2d 649 (2007) (legislature presumed to use plain meaning of statutory language)
- State v. Richland, 132 A.3d 702 (2015) (statutory interpretation begins with plain language)