State v. Veliz
176 Wash. 2d 849
| Wash. | 2013Background
- Veliz abducted NV in violation of a protection order that referenced a Court-approved parenting plan but no formal plan was filed at that time.
- The protection order existed under DVPA, chapter 26.50 RCW, and included a weekend visitation arrangement, with a phrase linking to a court-approved parenting plan.
- Veliz was charged with first-degree custodial interference under RCW 9A.40.060(2) based on denying access pursuant to a court-ordered parenting plan.
- A temporary parenting plan was entered in dissolution proceedings on August 25, 2008, but the information charging custodial interference was not amended.
- Veliz moved to dismiss under Knapstad; trial court denied; a jury convicted Veliz; the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.
- The Washington Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was insufficient evidence to prove a court-ordered parenting plan existed under RCW 9A.40.060(2).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a DVPA protection order can be a court-ordered parenting plan | Veliz (State) argues the protection order is a parenting plan | Veliz contends only a 26.09 RCW plan qualifies | No; DVPA orders are not parenting plans |
| What is the meaning of 'court-ordered parenting plan' in RCW 9A.40.060(2) | State maintains term is broad | Veliz argues term includes DVPA provisions | Term is a term of art referring to chapter 26.09 RCW documents |
| Whether the existence of a DVPA order with residential provisions satisfies the element | State could rely on DVPA residential provisions | DVPA provisions do not create a parenting plan under 26.09 | DVPA residential provisions do not constitute a court-ordered parenting plan |
| Alternative charging mechanisms for first-degree custodial interference | State could charge under RCW 9A.40.060(1) without a parenting plan | N/A | Subsection (1) permits charging without a parenting plan; conviction under (2) requires a parenting plan |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Morales, 173 Wn.2d 560 (2012) (statutory interpretation framework; intent of legislature)
- Ravenscroft v. Wash. Water Power Co., 136 Wn.2d 911 (1998) (plain meaning vs. term of art; when undefined, plain meaning applies)
- State v. Pesta, 87 Wn. App. 515 (1997) (court need not prove all elements of a parenting plan to charge custodial interference)
- State v. Veliz, 160 Wn. App. 396 (2011) (discussed definitions of permanent/temporary parenting plans)
- Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537 (1996) (statutory construction: avoid surplusage; give effect to all language)