State v. Vela-Montes, 287 Neb. 679

Victor Vela‑Montes was charged (Feb 2009) with two counts of first‑degree sexual assault; trial initially set Feb 1, 2010.
He filed a motion to discharge for statutory speedy trial; district court denied it; ensuing appeals produced a remand directing specific findings on excludable delay.
The Court of Appeals (later affirmed by the Supreme Court) held 45 days remained on the speedy‑trial clock; mandate issued Apr 4, 2012 and filed Apr 9; district court entered an order on the mandate May 4.
District court set trial for June 11, 2012; on June 1 Vela‑Montes filed a second motion to discharge claiming the 45 days had run; the court denied the motion and found the June 11 date was within the remaining time.
Vela‑Montes appealed the denial but then moved to withdraw and dismiss the appeal; the Supreme Court dismissed his appeal on his motion without calculating remaining days; the State moved for rehearing.
On rehearing, the Supreme Court concluded Vela‑Montes waived his statutory speedy‑trial right by filing the second motion to discharge (which caused a continuance beyond the statutory period), and affirmed the district court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court violated the statutory 6‑month speedy‑trial rule	State: trial timely because excludable periods were properly accounted for	Vela‑Montes: 45‑day remainder expired May 24, so June 11 trial was untimely	Denied: trial was timely when computed from district court action on mandate (May 4), 17 days remained when motion filed
Whether filing the second motion to discharge waived statutory speedy‑trial rights under § 29‑1207(4)(b)	State: motion caused continuance beyond statutory period and thus effected waiver	Vela‑Montes: motion sought discharge, not a waiver; appeal later withdrawn	Held: waiver occurred because the motion resulted in continuance beyond the statutory period, discharge was denied, and denial was affirmed
Whether the court must calculate exact remaining days after waiver	Vela‑Montes: exact calculation required to determine violation	State: waiver removes need for precise day count	Held: once waiver applies, exact calculation is unnecessary
Proper restart point for speedy‑trial clock after interlocutory appeal	Vela‑Montes: clock restarted when appellate mandate filed in clerk (Apr 9)	State: clock restarts when district court first acts on the mandate	Held: clock restarted when district court entered its order on the mandate (May 4)

State v. Brooks, 285 Neb. 640 (establishes statutory speedy‑trial computation method under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29‑1207)
State v. Mortensen, 841 N.W.2d 393 (describes waiver under § 29‑1207(4)(b) and when a motion to discharge can effect waiver)
State v. Williams, 277 Neb. 133 (holding that the excludable appeal period ends when the district court first acts on the appellate mandate)
State v. Vela‑Montes, 283 Neb. 530 (prior appellate decision affirming denial of discharge and identifying 45 days remaining)