State v. Vela, 900 N.W.2d 8

Background

Erick F. Vela pled guilty in 2003 to five counts of first-degree murder and related offenses arising from a 2002 bank robbery; a three-judge panel imposed five death sentences. Vela’s convictions and sentences were affirmed on direct appeal.
In 2014 Vela filed an amended postconviction motion alleging multiple instances of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel (same counsel at both stages); the district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing.
This court previously vacated that denial and remanded for application of the correct standard; on remand the district court again denied relief without an evidentiary hearing and Vela appealed.
On appeal Vela challenged six discrete ineffective-assistance claims: (1) counsel’s advice as to timing of guilty plea; (2) failure to discover/challenge a prosecutor–juror pastoral relationship; (3) failure to raise Batson errors on direct appeal; (4) failure to permit further intellectual-functioning testing by the State’s expert; (5) failure to request a malice definition instruction tied to an aggravating circumstance; and (6) failure to present evidence negating malice regarding a prior homicide used as aggravation.
The district court and this court applied Strickland prejudice/deficiency standards and postconviction rules requiring specific factual allegations; the court concluded Vela’s motion either relied on speculation or failed to show prejudice from counsel’s alleged deficiencies.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Timing of guilty plea (pre-L.B. 1 / pre-amended information / pre-discovery of Lundell body)	Vela: counsel should have advised earlier plea; earlier plea would have avoided death-penalty exposure or prejudicial developments (amendment alleging aggravators, discovery of Lundell body).	State: prior holdings and statutory law show death penalty remained available; amendment/retroactivity issues resolved against Vela; claims as to Lundell discovery are speculative.	Denied — counsel not deficient; no reasonable probability of different outcome; allegations speculative and no prejudice shown.
Prosecutor–juror pastoral relationship	Vela: counsel failed to timely discover/challenge that presiding juror was prosecutor’s pastor; failure to move for mistrial/new trial or raise on appeal prejudiced him.	State: juror expressly stated ability to be fair; record shows voir dire questions addressed potential concerns; no evidence counsel would have struck juror or that replacement would change result.	Denied — no prejudice shown; retention/strike discretionary; allegations conclusory/speculative.
Failure to raise Batson rulings on direct appeal	Vela: prosecutor struck sole Hispanic and sole African-American veniremembers; counsel failed to assign Batson error on appeal, which likely would have reversed.	State: prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons accepted by trial court; appellate counsel’s omission not prejudicial because claim lacked strength.	Denied — race-neutral reasons facially valid; no reasonable probability inclusion would change appeal.
Intellectual functioning / adaptive behavior testing	Vela: counsel prevented State’s expert from administering adaptive-behavior testing that would have shown intellectual disability, barring death penalty.	State: record shows expert used alternative methods and concluded overall adaptive behavior appropriate; any prevented testing would not have produced different result.	Denied — no prejudice; record supports expert’s conclusion; claim speculative.
Failure to request malice definition instruction (as to prior homicide used for aggravation)	Vela: counsel should have requested malice instruction to reduce weight of Lundell homicide as aggravator.	State: the aggravator (§ 29-2523(1)(a)) addresses prior serious/assaultive conduct regardless of mental capacity or degree of malice; record lacks legal justification/excuse.	Denied — even if malice not found, evidence of involvement supports the aggravator; no prejudice shown.
Failure to present evidence negating malice for Lundell killing	Vela: evidence (coercion, diminished intellectual functioning) would negate malice and reduce weight of the aggravator.	State: even lesser homicide or evidence of involvement supports the statutory aggravator; sentencing panel relied on other aggravators as well.	Denied — lack of prejudice; aggravator still supported; panel likely would not have changed sentence.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (ineffective-assistance two-part test: deficiency and prejudice)
Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (peremptory challenges subject to Equal Protection; three-step Batson framework)
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (capital procedure and jury sentencing significance)
Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (Florida capital sentencing; court cited by defendant but not raised below)
Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (standards for evaluating intellectual disability and adaptive functioning)
State v. Vela, 279 Neb. 94 (direct-appeal opinion affirming convictions and sentencing)
State v. Galindo, 278 Neb. 599 (holding notice-of-aggravation procedural rule not retroactive)