State v. Vela
297 Neb. 227
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Erick F. Vela pled guilty (June 12, 2003) to five counts of first-degree murder and related felonies arising from a 2002 bank robbery; a three-judge panel imposed five death sentences after an aggravation hearing.
- Vela’s trial counsel also represented him on direct appeal; this postconviction motion was his first opportunity to raise ineffective-assistance claims.
- Vela filed an amended postconviction motion raising numerous ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims; the district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing; this Court remanded for reconsideration under the correct standard and the district court again denied relief.
- On appeal Vela challenged six specific claims of ineffective assistance (timing of plea, prosecutor–juror relationship, failure to raise Batson on appeal, intellectual-functioning testing, failure to request malice instruction, failure to present evidence negating malice).
- The district court concluded Vela’s allegations were speculative or foreclosed by the record and prior appellate holdings; this Court affirmed, finding no entitlement to an evidentiary hearing.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timing of guilty plea | Counsel should have advised earlier plea; earlier plea could have avoided death penalty exposure (pre-L.B.1 or before amended information) and effects of later-discovered Lundell homicide | Prior precedent and statutory timing show death penalty remained available; claims about Lundell discovery are speculative and counsel could not foresee or prevent discovery | Denied — counsel not shown deficient; no prejudice established |
| Prosecutor–presiding juror relationship | Counsel failed to discover/challenge that juror was prosecutor’s pastor; counsel failed to move for mistrial or raise on appeal | Voir dire showed juror affirmed impartiality; no allegation counsel would have struck him or that relationship was material | Denied — no prejudice; retention of juror within trial court discretion |
| Failure to raise Batson on direct appeal | Counsel failed to assign error after prosecutor used peremptory strikes on sole Hispanic and sole African-American venire members | Prosecutor gave race-neutral reasons (personality, prior prosecutions); trial court found reasons persuasive | Denied — race-neutral reasons sufficient; no reasonable probability appeal outcome would differ |
| Intellectual functioning testing | Counsel prevented State expert from administering adaptive-behavior testing that would have shown intellectual disability and precluded death | Record shows expert used alternative measures and concluded overall adaptive behavior appropriate; no prejudice shown | Denied — no deficient performance or prejudice; prior record supports finding |
| Failure to request malice instruction | Counsel failed to request definition of malice for use of Lundell killing as aggravating evidence | Aggravating circumstance (§ 29-2523(1)(a)) concerns history of assaultive/terrorizing activity, not mental state; even if malice not proven, evidence of involvement supports the aggravator | Denied — no prejudice; instruction would not likely have changed weighing |
| Failure to present evidence negating malice | Counsel failed to present evidence (e.g., coercion, diminished IQ) to negate malice re: Lundell killing | Even if malice reduced, evidence of involvement supports the statutory aggravator; sentencing panel relied on multiple aggravators | Denied — no prejudice shown; aggravator still supported |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes deficient performance and prejudice test for ineffective assistance)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (addressed role of jury in capital sentencing; background to Nebraska statutory changes)
- Hurst v. Florida, 136 S. Ct. 616 (U.S. Supreme Court decision discussed by Vela but not raised below)
- Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (addressed standards for evaluating intellectual disability; discussed but not directly dispositive here)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (peremptory challenge equal protection framework)
- State v. Vela, 279 Neb. 94 (direct appeal; prior Nebraska Supreme Court decisions addressing many of these same arguments)
- State v. Galindo, 278 Neb. 599 (holding that notice-of-aggravation rule did not apply retroactively)
- State v. Watson, 295 Neb. 802 (standards for postconviction motions and evidentiary hearings)
- State v. Ely, 295 Neb. 607 (postconviction review of appellate counsel claims)
- State v. Starks, 294 Neb. 361 (prejudice standard for omitted appellate issues)
- State v. Oliveira-Coutinho, 291 Neb. 294 (review standards for Batson race-neutral explanations)
