State v. Vela
297 Neb. 227
| Neb. | 2017Background
- Erick F. Vela pled guilty (June 12, 2003) to five first-degree murders and related felonies arising from a 2002 bank robbery; a three-judge panel imposed death sentences for each murder.
- Vela directly appealed; this court affirmed his convictions and sentences (State v. Vela, 279 Neb. 94).
- In 2014 Vela filed an amended postconviction motion (first opportunity to raise ineffectiveness because same counsel represented him at trial and on direct appeal) asserting multiple Strickland-based ineffective-assistance claims; the district court denied relief without an evidentiary hearing.
- This court earlier vacated and remanded because the district court used an incorrect standard; on remand the district court reconsidered under the correct standard and again denied relief without an evidentiary hearing as to each claim.
- Vela appealed the denial; he also asked the court to consider a separately argued Hurst-based claim not raised below (the court declined to consider that unpreserved claim).
- The Supreme Court affirmed, concluding Vela failed to allege facts showing deficient performance and prejudice for the claims litigated in the postconviction motion.
Issues
| Issue | Vela's Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Timing of guilty plea (failure to advise earlier plea) | Counsel should have had Vela plead earlier to avoid death-penalty exposure (LB1 enactment, amended info, and before discovery of Lundell body) | Existing precedent and record show death penalty remained available; alleged advantages are speculative and counsel could not predict discovery/timing | Denied — no deficient performance or prejudice; speculative benefits do not establish Strickland relief |
| Prosecutor–presiding juror relationship (failure to discover/challenge) | Counsel failed to discover/raise mistrial/new-trial based on prosecutor being juror’s pastor; also failed to raise on appeal | Voir dire showed juror could be fair; no allegation counsel would have struck him or extent of relationship; retention was discretionary | Denied — no demonstrated prejudice; juror statements negate bias and speculation about a different venire is insufficient |
| Failure to raise Batson rulings on direct appeal | Counsel should have assigned error to trial court’s overruling of Batson objections to strikes of sole Hispanic and sole African-American veniremembers | Prosecutor offered race-neutral reasons accepted by trial court; appellate challenge lacked likely merit | Denied — appellate counsel not ineffective because Batson challenge lacked reasonable probability of success on appeal |
| Failure to permit State expert adaptive-behavior testing / inadequate presentation of intellectual disability evidence | Counsel prevented full adaptive-behavior testing (challenging second prong of intellectual disability), prejudicing mitigation presentation | Record shows expert (Zlomke) evaluated adaptive behavior via informants and concluded overall adaptive behavior appropriate; no prejudice from alleged omission | Denied — alternative testing/assessments were performed and supported trial court’s findings; no Strickland prejudice |
| Failure to request jury instruction defining "malice" for aggravator based on Lundell killing | Counsel should have sought malice definition and presented evidence to negate malice (coercion, diminished capacity) | The §29-2523(1)(a) aggravator concerns prior assaultive/terrorizing history; even absent malice a lesser homicide would still support the aggravator; no reasonable probability outcome would differ | Denied — failure to seek malice instruction or additional evidence did not prejudice sentencing; aggravator still supported by evidence of the killing |
| Failure to present evidence to negate malice for Lundell killing | Same as prior row: evidence of coercion or diminished intellect would negate malice and reduce weight of aggravator | Even if malice not shown, evidence of involvement/lesser homicide would support aggravator; panel likely would not have given materially different weight | Denied — no prejudice shown; aggravator would remain supported regardless of malice finding |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two-part ineffective-assistance test: deficiency and prejudice)
- Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (peremptory challenges cannot be used for purposeful racial discrimination)
- Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (death-penalty sentencing procedure limitations relevant to timing arguments)
- State v. Vela, 279 Neb. 94 (direct-appeal opinion affirming convictions and addressing related procedural claims)
- State v. Galindo, 278 Neb. 599 (held notice-of-aggravation procedural change not retroactive to original informations)
- State v. Watson, 295 Neb. 802 (standard for when an evidentiary hearing is required on postconviction claims)
- State v. Ely, 295 Neb. 607 (postconviction is first opportunity to raise ineffective assistance when same counsel represented at trial and on appeal)
- State v. Starks, 294 Neb. 361 (standard for prejudice assessment as to appellate counsel omissions)
- State v. Oliveira-Coutinho, 291 Neb. 294 (review standards for Batson race-neutral explanations)
- Moore v. Texas, 137 S. Ct. 1039 (Supreme Court decision addressing standards for assessing intellectual disability in capital cases)
