State v. Vaughn, 823 N.W.2d 543

Vaughn was convicted by jury of attempted first-degree intentional homicide while armed for stabbing his mother's boyfriend.
He underwent multiple competency evaluations; initial inpatient exams found him competent despite an adjustment disorder; later hearings questioned competency but upheld competence.
Vaughn repeatedly refused to participate in court proceedings, including coming to court, watching via video, and participating in voir dire, jury trial, and sentencing.
The trial court found Vaughn had voluntarily relinquished his rights by his conduct, and thus the court proceeded with proceedings despite his absence.
Vaughn's counsel discussed the right to testify with him; Vaughn asserted he did not wish to testify, and the court found he knowingly waived this right.
Vaughn received a bifurcated sentence of 35 years (20 years confinement followed by 15 years HS) and was subsequently civilly committed for treatment after postconviction proceedings.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Vaughn validly waived presence at trial	Vaughn intentionally relinquished his presence rights with warnings respected by court.	Mental illness rendered his waiver not knowing or intentional.	Waiver found valid; presence rights waived by conduct while competent.
Whether Vaughn validly waived the right to testify	Waiver occurred through trial record and attorney discussions; defendant knowingly relinquished.	No on-record colloquy due to defendant’s non-participation; waiver invalid as not knowing and voluntary.	Waiver valid; failure to conduct Weed colloquy did not undo waiver given the practical impediments.
Whether the sentencing relied on inaccurate information about Vaughn's mental health	If inaccuracies were relied on, sentence may require modification.	Court did not rely on inaccurate mental-health information to impose sentence.	No reversible reliance on inaccurate information; sentence affirmed.
Whether Vaughn’s developing mental illness constitutes a new factor warranting sentence modification	New psychiatric diagnoses support modification.	Even with new factor, modification not warranted given treatment accommodations and lack of frustration of sentencing purpose.	Harbor standard applied; no basis to modify sentence; no new-factor justification.

State v. Divanovic, 200 Wis.2d 210 (Ct. App. 1996) (defines waiver and forfeiture concepts for presence at trial)
State v. Ndina, 315 Wis.2d 653 (2009) (clarifies waiver standards and forfeiture concepts)
Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (U.S. 1993) (competence to stand trial separate from ability to represent oneself)
State v. Byrge, 237 Wis.2d 197 (2000) (competence to stand trial; standard of review)
State v. Weed, 263 Wis.2d 434 (2003) (colloquy required to ensure knowing waiver of right to testify)
State v. Harbor, 333 Wis.2d 53 (2011) (new factor in sentence modification; standard clarified)
State v. Ninham, 333 Wis.2d 335 (2011) (framework for evaluating new-factor sentencing considerations)