State v. Vaughan-France, 279 Or. App. 305

Background

Victim and defendant (then-boyfriend) were in an Oregon motel room; defendant assaulted, threatened, strangled, bit, and held the victim for several hours overnight while keeping knives displayed and disabling phones.
Defendant forced the victim into the bathroom and hid her there when others knocked; he threatened to harm her family and told her to be quiet or be killed.
Victim’s cell phone was smashed and motel phone unplugged; attack lasted roughly midnight to 6:00 a.m.; victim escaped after defendant left the room and called 9-1-1.
Defendant was charged with multiple crimes including first-degree kidnapping (ORS 163.235(1)(d) via secret confinement under ORS 163.225(1)(b)), second-degree assault, and coercion; trial court denied motions for judgment of acquittal on kidnapping and assault and convicted defendant.
During voir dire, a prospective juror (juror Z) initially said she did not think she could be fair because of her own history of sexual and domestic violence, but after questioning ultimately affirmed she could follow law and set aside her experience; trial court denied defense motion to remove juror Z for cause.
On sentencing the court imposed upward departure on the coercion count partly because of a pending out-of-state arrest warrant; the State conceded that a mere unserved arrest warrant alone is not a substantial and compelling ground for upward departure, and the court remanded for resentencing.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Sufficiency of evidence for first-degree kidnapping (secret confinement in place not likely to be found)	Evidence showed defendant secretly confined victim (bathroom, hiding when visitors came), unplugged phone, smashed cell, and threatened family — satisfying ORS 163.225(1)(b) and intent to terrorize	Several people knew the victim was at the motel; motel room is a place where she could be found, so confinement was not “secret” and was incidental to other crimes	Affirmed: viewed in state's favor, a reasonable juror could find secret confinement and substantial interference with liberty under Parkins/Montgomery analysis
Whether confinement was merely incidental to other crimes (intent element)	Kidnapping requires intent to interfere substantially with liberty; evidence of hours-long detention, concealment, and threats shows intent to substantially interfere	Confinement was incidental to assault/other crimes and not a separate kidnapping	Affirmed: evidence supports intent to substantially interfere for a substantial period, not merely incidental
Challenge for cause to juror Z (actual bias)	Juror Z initially said she couldn’t be fair based on trauma history; must be excused for actual bias	Juror Z later affirmed she could apply law and separate her experience from the facts; trial court’s firsthand observation controls	Affirmed: no abuse of discretion; trial court reasonably concluded juror could be fair (Barone standard)
Upward departure at sentencing based solely on pending out-of-state arrest warrant	State argued departure warranted by defendant’s persistent similar offenses and that crime occurred while another matter was pending	Defendant argued that an unserved arrest warrant alone is not a substantial and compelling reason for upward departure	Remanded for resentencing: court accepted State’s concession that a mere arrest warrant, without more (e.g., probation or knowledge), is insufficient for upward departure

Key Cases Cited

State v. Parkins, 346 Or. 333, 211 P.3d 262 (2009) (interprets “secretly confine...in a place where the person is not likely to be found” as place where it is not probable the person will be located accidentally or through searching; fact-specific inquiry)
State v. Montgomery, 50 Or. App. 381, 624 P.2d 151 (1981) (victim concealed in bathroom and assailants’ efforts can make an otherwise obvious place one where victim is not likely to be found)
State v. Wolleat, 338 Or. 469, 111 P.3d 1131 (2005) (intent element of kidnapping requires intent to confine for a substantial period)
State v. Barone, 328 Or. 68, 969 P.2d 1013 (1998) (standard for actual-bias challenge: whether juror’s views would substantially impair performance as juror)
State v. Dalessio, 228 Or. App. 531, 208 P.3d 1021 (2009) (trial court’s advantage in observing juror demeanor; removal for cause required where juror disavows ability to be fair)
State v. Carter, 205 Or. App. 460, 134 P.3d 1078 (2006) (abuse of discretion to retain juror who unequivocally states inability to be fair)
State v. Gibson, 183 Or. App. 25, 51 P.3d 619 (2002) (remand for resentencing where court’s findings were inadequate to identify departure grounds)
State v. King, 307 Or. 332, 768 P.2d 391 (1989) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence on judgment of acquittal)