State v. Vanzandt (Slip Opinion)
28 N.E.3d 1267
Ohio2015Background
- Terrell Vanzandt (formerly Asberry) was acquitted on drug‑trafficking charges and moved under R.C. 2953.52 to have the case records sealed; the trial court granted the motion and the records were sealed on October 4, 2012.
- Three days later the state charged Vanzandt with retaliating against a witness from the sealed drug case and, more than three months after sealing, moved to unseal the prior record to use it in the retaliation prosecution.
- The trial court granted the state’s motion to unseal over Vanzandt’s objection.
- The First District Court of Appeals affirmed, relying on Pepper Pike v. Doe to conclude that courts have extrastatutory discretion to unseal records in unusual and exceptional cases.
- The Ohio Supreme Court accepted review to decide whether courts may unseal records for purposes other than the specific exceptions enumerated in R.C. 2953.53(D).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a court may unseal records sealed under R.C. 2953.52 for purposes not listed in R.C. 2953.53(D) | The state: Pepper Pike permits extrastatutory unsealing in unusual/exceptional cases; trial court may exercise discretion to unseal for prosecution needs | Vanzandt: R.C. 2953.53(D) unambiguously prohibits access except for its four enumerated exceptions; no judicially created exceptions | Court: R.C. 2953.53(D) is mandatory and unambiguous; courts may not create additional exceptions; unsealing was unauthorized; reverse trial court |
| Whether Pepper Pike’s recognition of limited extrastatutory sealing authority permits corresponding extrastatutory unsealing of already‑sealed records | The state: Pepper Pike’s logic extends to unsealing; courts retain inherent power to unseal in exceptional cases | Vanzandt: Pepper Pike addressed sealing in legislative silence and does not override an express statutory prohibition on unsealing | Court: Pepper Pike arose from legislative silence and is inapplicable where statute expressly forbids the act; Pepper Pike does not authorize judicially created exceptions to R.C. 2953.53(D) |
Key Cases Cited
- Pepper Pike v. Doe, 66 Ohio St.2d 374, 421 N.E.2d 1303 (Ohio 1981) (recognized limited judicial authority to seal records in unusual/exceptional cases where statute was silent)
- Morris Coal Co. v. Donley, 73 Ohio St. 298, 76 N.E. 945 (Ohio 1906) (courts must not create exceptions that amount to statutory abrogation)
- Armstrong v. John R. Jurgensen Co., 136 Ohio St.3d 58, 2013-Ohio-2237, 990 N.E.2d 568 (Ohio 2013) (statutory text must be applied as written when unambiguous)
- State v. Golphin, 81 Ohio St.3d 543, 692 N.E.2d 608 (Ohio 1998) (use of "shall" indicates mandatory obligation)
- Cantwell v. State, 18 Ohio St. 477 (Ohio 1869) ("shall not" denotes mandatory prohibition)