State v. Vanest
2017 Ohio 5561
| Ohio Ct. App. | 2017Background
- Angela Vanest was convicted after a bench trial in Barberton Municipal Court for child endangering (R.C. 2919.22(A)) involving her 11‑year‑old daughter, E.V.; she appealed.
- Incident: after adults shared a pitcher of margaritas at ~10:00 p.m., a 12‑year‑old (A.N.)—unlicensed and with no driving experience—was put behind the wheel of Vanest’s van for a >2‑mile drive on city "main streets" at night.
- Vanest protested when A.N. was given the keys and acknowledged the situation was "wrong," but did not prevent A.N. from driving or otherwise secure her daughter’s safe transport.
- No accident or physical injury occurred; prosecution relied on the substantial risk created by the circumstances and Vanest’s omission.
- Trial court denied Vanest’s Crim.R. 29 motion; the appellate court considered sufficiency and manifest‑weight challenges and affirmed the conviction.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Vanest) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sufficiency: Did Vanest create a "substantial risk" to child’s health/safety by omission? | Evidence supports that Vanest recklessly created a substantial risk by allowing an unlicensed, inexperienced 12‑yr‑old to drive at night while adults were intoxicated. | Vanest argued there was no substantial risk because A.N. drove "safely," no one was hurt, and Vanest did nothing proactive to create the situation. | Held: Sufficient evidence; omission can satisfy R.C. 2919.22(A); substantial risk exists even without actual injury. |
| Sufficiency: Did Vanest violate a duty of care/protection or have custody/control of E.V.? | State treated Vanest as person with custody/control and duty; evidence supported conviction on omission theory. | Vanest argued she delegated responsibility to her fiancé and that he had custody/control and duty to ensure safe transport. | Held: Argument forfeited (not raised in Crim.R. 29) and inadequately briefed; court declined to address—argument overruled. |
| Culpable mental state: Was recklessness established? | State relied on Vanest’s acknowledgment of risk and failure to act while intoxicated to show recklessness. | Vanest did not contest culpable state on appeal. | Held: Recklessness is the mental state for child endangering; not contested and treated as met. |
| Manifest weight: Should conviction be reversed as against manifest weight? | State relied on credibility of witnesses and the record; judge was entitled to weigh evidence. | Vanest asserted conviction against manifest weight but did not develop persuasive arguments about credibility or contradictions. | Held: Manifest‑weight claim rejected for failure to develop argument; not an exceptional case where the trier of fact lost its way. |
Key Cases Cited
- Kamel v. State, 12 Ohio St.3d 306 (1984) (lack of eventual injury does not negate substantial risk for child endangering)
- McGee v. State, 79 Ohio St.3d 193 (1997) (recklessness is the culpable mental state for child endangering)
- Jenks v. State, 61 Ohio St.3d 259 (1991) (standard for sufficiency review: view evidence in light most favorable to prosecution)
- Thompkins v. Oklahoma, 78 Ohio St.3d 380 (1997) (distinguishing sufficiency and manifest‑weight review; de novo standard for sufficiency)
- Hartley v. State, 194 Ohio App.3d 486 (2011) (evaluation of likelihood of risk is fact‑intensive)
- Otten v. State, 33 Ohio App.3d 339 (1986) (manifest‑weight standard and deference to trier of fact)
- Sammons v. State, 58 Ohio St.2d 460 (1979) (child endangering may be proven by omission)