State v. Vallejo, 449 P.3d 39

Background

Defendant Keith Vallejo was tried and convicted by a jury of ten counts of forcible sexual abuse and one count of object rape for sexual abuse of two sisters‑in‑law (J.K. and H.K.) while they lived with his family. The counts relating to both victims were tried together.
Allegations included repeated touching, fondling, and digital penetration of H.K., and multiple instances of touching and rubbing of J.K. while she slept or appeared asleep. Both victims delayed disclosure; H.K. later told a friend (J.J.) and her family.
Vallejo discussed the allegations with friend Rocky Steele at a farmhouse before charges; Steele testified at trial. Vallejo argued those statements were privileged attorney‑client communications because Steele was a law‑school graduate who he thought might provide legal advice. The district court found no privilege.
Trial counsel did not move to sever charges, did not object to certain testimony (including J.J.’s recounting of H.K.’s statements and testimony about the mother’s “impression” that H.K. needed a blessing), and did not immediately object to several in‑court references to the witnesses as “victim(s).” Counsel used cross‑examination and closing argument to attack credibility and suggest collusion.
The district court denied motions for mistrial after the judge and multiple witnesses used the term “victim.” Vallejo appealed, arguing (inter alia) ineffective assistance, erroneous admission of privileged communications, and prejudice from references to “victims.” The Utah Supreme Court affirmed the convictions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Vallejo)	Defendant's Argument (State/Court)	Held
Whether counsel was ineffective for not moving to sever counts for each victim	Failure to move was per se unreasonable and prejudiced Vallejo because combined trials allowed cross‑bolstering and admission of each sister’s testimony	Strategic choice: trying both cases together could reasonably aim to discredit both witnesses and avoid conviction; severance would not necessarily exclude probative evidence	Counsel’s choice was objectively reasonable; no ineffective assistance on this ground
Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to J.J.’s testimony recounting H.K.’s out‑of‑court statements	J.J.’s testimony was inadmissible hearsay and counsel should have objected	Counsel reasonably declined to object because the testimony could be used to impeach/investigate consistency and fit defense strategy; district court admitted it as prior consistent statement	No deficient performance shown; counsel’s decision was reasonable
Whether counsel was ineffective for not objecting to testimony about Mother’s “spiritual impression” and whether the testimony violated Rules 403/610	Testimony invited jurors to rely on religious belief and divine confirmation to bolster H.K.’s credibility; counsel should have objected	Counsel reasonably avoided objecting because defendant had opened religious context (his church service, leadership) and objecting risked foreclosing similar favorable evidence	Failure to object was not objectively deficient given tactical considerations; no relief
Whether farmhouse statements to Steele were privileged attorney‑client communications	Vallejo sought legal advice from Steele; statements should have been excluded under attorney‑client privilege	Court found statements were informal, among friends, not made for purpose of obtaining legal services; Steele offered no legal advice and repeatedly told Vallejo he was not a practicing attorney	District court’s factual findings supported exclusion of privilege; admission of Steele’s testimony was proper
Whether references to witnesses as “victim(s)” required mistrial or constituted ineffective assistance	Judge and witnesses’ use of “victim(s)” improperly bolstered credibility and violated presumption of innocence; mistrial warranted or counsel ineffective for not objecting further	Single inadvertent judicial remark cured by general neutrality instruction; other uses were limited or general and prosecutor/instructions mitigated harm	Denial of mistrial not an abuse of discretion; any counsel failures did not prejudice defendant — no reversal

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (Ineffective assistance of counsel standard)
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (Objective‑reasonableness inquiry for counsel performance)
State v. Bond, 361 P.3d 104 (Utah 2015) (Futility of motions and ineffective assistance analysis)
Menzies v. State, 344 P.3d 581 (Utah 2014) (Standard of review for ineffective assistance claims)
State v. Cardall, 982 P.2d 79 (Utah 1999) (Abuse of discretion review for mistrial denial)
Archuleta v. Galetka, 267 P.3d 232 (Utah 2011) (Ineffective assistance framework)
Met v. State, 388 P.3d 447 (Utah 2016) (Presumption that counsel actions can be reasonable trial strategy)
Moler v. CW Mgmt. Corp., 190 P.3d 1250 (Utah 2008) (Privilege review standards)
State v. Kruger, 6 P.3d 1116 (Utah 2000) (Presenting facts in light most favorable to jury verdict)