State v. V. Johnson, 519 P.3d 804

Vernon Johnson was sentenced Aug 17, 2017 to a five-year suspended DOC term (concurrent counts) with conditions including MSOTA-certified sexual-offender treatment and no electronic access to pornography.
He admitted an initial violation (accessing pornography) on Jan 9, 2020; an intervention added conditions (no internet-capable phone without approval; 20 days continuous supervision at Alpha House), which he failed to complete.
Johnson was terminated from MSOTA treatment on Aug 16, 2021 for continued unauthorized internet use; the State filed a revocation petition Sept 8, 2021.
At disposition Johnson admitted additional violations; the probation officer recommended 875 days credit and a new DOC sentence of 2 years, 7 months, 7 days (which would expire later than the original sentence’s anticipated end).
The District Court adopted the recommendation, credited 875 days, denied further credit based on continued violations, and imposed the new sentence Jan 24, 2022; Johnson appealed arguing (1) the court could not impose a sentence that extended beyond the original commitment end date, and (2) there was insufficient record support to deny credit for elapsed time from Jan 9, 2020 to Aug 17, 2021.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1) Whether § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii), MCA bars imposing a revocation sentence that results in a later calendar end date than the original sentence	The State: revocation courts may impose the original sentence (or any sentence not longer than original imprisonment/commitment); elapsed-time credit mechanics—not § 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii)—govern actual end date	Johnson: a revocation sentence cannot extend the defendant’s commitment term beyond the original sentence end date	Court: Affirmed—§ 46-18-203(7)(a)(iii) permits reimposition of the original sentence (or any sentence not longer than the original), and does not categorically bar a revocation sentence that results in a later calendar end date once elapsed-time credit is applied
2) Whether the record supports denial of credit for elapsed time between Jan 9, 2020 and Aug 17, 2021	The State: record shows ongoing, specific violations (admissions, termination from treatment, failure to complete Alpha House, continued impermissible searches) warrant denying credit for that period	Johnson: no specific record/recollection of violations for that claimed period; court’s order lacked specific findings and thus could not deny elapsed-time credit	Court: Affirmed—denial of additional credit was supported because the record demonstrated specific, continuing violations during the claimed period, satisfying the statutory requirement to deny credit only when specific violations are shown

State v. Oppelt, 184 Mont. 48, 601 P.2d 394 (1979) (revocation leaves defendant subject to execution of original sentence as though it were never suspended)
Gonzales v. Mahoney, 307 Mont. 228, 37 P.3d 653 (2001) (reiterating that suspended sentences carry a fixed term that hangs over the defendant)
State v. Cook, 364 Mont. 161, 272 P.3d 50 (2012) (revocation subjects defendant to execution of original sentence)
State v. Jardee, 399 Mont. 459, 461 P.3d 108 (2020) (statutory changes eliminated district court discretion to grant or deny elapsed-time credit)
State v. Tippets, 408 Mont. 249, 509 P.3d 1 (2022) (calculating credit for time served is a legal mandate reviewed de novo)
State v. Gudmundsen, 410 Mont. 67, 517 P.3d 146 (2022) (district court cannot deny elapsed-time credit unless specific violations during the claimed period are demonstrated)
State v. Pennington, 410 Mont. 104, 517 P.3d 894 (2022) (order denying elapsed-time credit must be based on specific record or recollection of violations)
Roberts v. United States, 320 U.S. 264, 64 S. Ct. 113 (1943) (federal authority cited for the principle that revocation can leave defendant subject to original sentence)