925 N.W.2d 503
S.D.2019Background
- Gregory DeJesus Two Hearts was arrested after two Aberdeen robberies (Sooper Stop, March 13, 2015; Casino Korner, Jan. 19, 2015). He was detained at the state penitentiary after a parole violation and exhibited self-harm, restraint, and received sedative medications in late March 2015.
- Two Hearts requested interviews; detectives interviewed him March 25 and March 31, 2015, after advising Miranda rights. He made incriminating statements about both robberies.
- Grand juries indicted him (Sooper Stop and a joint Casino Korner indictment). He first appeared June 22, 2015; trials occurred in 2017 after motions, severance, reassignment requests, and continuances.
- Two Hearts moved to dismiss under the 180-day statutory speedy-trial rule and on Sixth Amendment speedy-trial grounds; he also moved to suppress his statements arguing involuntariness, invalid Miranda waiver, and that his requests for counsel were ignored.
- The circuit court denied dismissal and suppression; Two Hearts was convicted (including admission to habitual offender information in one case) and sentenced to consecutive terms. The Supreme Court of South Dakota consolidated appeals and affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether trials violated SDCL 23A-44-5.1 (180-day rule) | State: delays excused by good cause (motions pending, severance, reassignment, defense non-responsiveness) | Two Hearts: state failed to schedule trials; delays attributable to State; severance/reassignment not justify tolling | Court: many delays properly tolled (defense continuances, motions, scheduling failures); only 147 non-excluded days before trial — no statutory violation |
| Whether Sixth Amendment speedy-trial right violated | State: delay largely caused by defendant; minimal prejudice | Two Hearts: actual delay over year → presumptively prejudicial (27–29 months from arrest to trials) | Court: majority of delay attributable to defendant; no showing of prejudice → no constitutional violation |
| Whether Miranda waiver was valid | State: oral waivers + conduct (requested interviews, acknowledged rights) show knowing, voluntary waiver | Two Hearts: impaired by withdrawal, restraints, sedation → could not knowingly waive | Court: totality shows he understood rights and voluntarily waived them; waiver valid |
| Whether statements were voluntary / invocation of counsel | State: interrogation tactics (leniency offers, some deception) did not overbear will; equivocal requests for counsel | Two Hearts: withdrawal, restraints, promises of leniency, false statements overbore will; invoked counsel but questioning continued | Court: statements voluntary under totality; leniency/deception did not directly cause confessions; equivocal references to counsel did not require cessation until final clear invocation (which occurred only after confessions), so any post-invocation questioning error was harmless |
Key Cases Cited
- Hays v. Weber, 645 N.W.2d 591 (S.D. 2002) (180‑day rule is procedural and distinct from constitutional speedy‑trial analysis)
- Andrews v. State, 787 N.W.2d 181 (S.D. 2009) (definition and calculation of 180‑day rule start and tolling principles)
- Webb v. State, 539 N.W.2d 92 (S.D. 1995) (examples of delays excluded for defendant‑caused reasons and pretrial motions)
- Cottrill v. State, 660 N.W.2d 624 (S.D. 2003) (defendant assent to delay undermines later speedy‑trial claim)
- Tuttle v. State, 650 N.W.2d 20 (S.D. 2002) (standard for reviewing Miranda waiver and voluntariness of confessions)
- Holman v. State, 721 N.W.2d 452 (S.D. 2006) (false promises and coercion: must be direct cause of confession to require suppression)
- Lewandowski v. State, 921 N.W.2d 915 (S.D. 2019) (factors for knowing, intelligent Miranda waiver and equivocal invocation analysis)