State v. Turnidge
373 P.3d 138
Or.2016Background
- December 2008: a bomb placed near a Woodburn bank exploded while law enforcement attempted to disarm it; two officers were killed, one officer and a bank employee were injured. Investigation led to Bruce Turnidge and his son Joshua; both were arrested, jointly tried, convicted on 10 counts of aggravated murder and related felonies, and each sentenced to death. This opinion affirms Bruce Turnidge’s convictions and death sentences on direct review.
- The prosecution’s theory: Turnidge (senior) and Joshua built a lethal bomb, called in threats to draw law enforcement, and had a mixed motive—bank robbery and intent to kill responding officers. Evidence included purchases and construction of bomb components, placement of the device, and the threatening phone call referencing two banks.
- Pretrial disputes included excusal of jurors for cause and destruction of juror questionnaires; those issues were resolved as in State v. Turnidge (Joshua).
- The state sought to admit decades-old statements and conduct by Bruce expressing anti-government sentiment, celebration of the Oklahoma City bombing, interest in forming an armed militia, threats to kill officers, and related conduct; Turnidge moved to exclude as irrelevant/prejudicial. The trial court admitted the evidence as probative of motive.
- Guilt-phase challenges included (a) use of an "acquittal-first" jury instruction under ORS 136.460(2), (b) sufficiency of evidence to prove the statutory "intentionally and personally" elements of aggravated felony murder, and (c) causation jury instructions; the court rejected Turnidge’s claims, following analysis in the companion Joshua opinion.
- Penalty-phase issues included (a) an unpreserved claim that a trial-court remark about allocution (that he would "probably be subject to cross-examination") was plain error and vitiated his waiver of allocution, and (b) an unpreserved claim that a prosecutor’s closing argued to "silence" the defendant inappropriately infringed free-speech rights. The court denied plain-error relief on both issues.
Issues
| Issue | State's Position | Turnidge's Position | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of decades-old anti-government statements and militia activity (relevance) | Evidence is relevant to motive and supports state’s inference that defendant intended to kill responding officers and fund militia activity | Evidence remote, not similar to the charged bombing, and speculative as to motive | Admissible: low relevancy threshold; evidence logically supported motive inference; trial court properly denied exclusion |
| "Acquittal-first" instruction under ORS 136.460(2) for aggravated felony murder | Instruction valid and applicable; no constitutional defect | Instruction improper because aggravated felony murder is not a degree-based offense and thus not a lesser-included offense | Rejected Turnidge’s claim — held proper for reasons adopted from Turnidge (Joshua) opinion |
| Sufficiency of evidence on "personally and intentionally" elements of aggravated felony murder; motion for judgment of acquittal | Evidence (purchase/building of bomb, phone call, placement) permits reasonable inference defendant acted intentionally and personally | Evidence insufficient to prove Turnidge personally and intentionally committed murders | Denied — evidence sufficient; arguments rejected as in Turnidge (Joshua) |
| Trial-court remark re: allocution ("probably subject to cross-examination") — plain error claim | No plain error: remark non-operative, made outside prosecutors’ presence, no apparent effect; record does not show coercive or inaccurate advice | Remark was legal error that may have deterred defendant from exercising allocution; waiver not knowingly made | No plain-error relief: legal point was disputed; record does not irrefutably show error or effect on defendant’s choice |
| Prosecutor’s closing statements urging death to "silence" defendant (First Amendment) | Comments addressed future dangerousness, based on evidence; permissible argument | Prosecutor improperly urged punishment to silence political speech, violating free-speech protections | No reversible error: the comments were contextualized as evidence of future dangerousness and permissible in penalty-phase argument |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Hayward, 327 Or 397 (evidence of ideology relevant to motive)
- State v. Brumwell, 350 Or 93 (ideology evidence admissible in capital sentencing context)
- State v. Rogers, 330 Or 282 (allocution right includes unsworn statement to penalty-phase jury; trial control to prevent prejudice)
- DeAngelo v. Schiedler, 306 Or 91 (constitutional right to be heard/allocution)
- Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992) (limitations on using organizational membership when irrelevant to violent conduct)
- Beck v. Alabama, 447 U.S. 625 (1980) (constitutional concerns about withholding lesser-included offense instructions)
- State v. Brown, 310 Or 347 (plain-error standard for unpreserved claims)