State v. Turner, 768 S.E.2d 356

In April 2005 Victor Lee Turner pled guilty (pursuant to a plea agreement) to multiple charges including first-degree rape, first-degree sexual offense, robbery with a dangerous weapon, kidnapping, possession of a firearm by a felon, and felony possession of cocaine; consolidated sentences produced lengthy active terms.
The underlying 2004 assault: victim (hotel clerk) reported robbery and sexual assault; hospital personnel collected a sexual assault kit and law enforcement preserved the kit.
SBI testing matched DNA from the victim’s thigh to Turner and found the vaginal swab consistent with a mixture including Turner; the analyst reported an extremely high likelihood ratio favoring Turner as the contributor.
In June 2013 Turner (pro se) moved for postconviction DNA testing under N.C.G.S. §§ 15A-267–270, alleging only that testing “is material to defendant’s defense.”
Trial court denied the motion without a hearing, concluding the cited statutes related to pretrial testing; Turner sought appellate review by certiorari after an untimely notice of appeal.
The Court of Appeals allowed certiorari, reviewed de novo the legal conclusions and for abuse of discretion the factual findings, and affirmed the denial.

Issue	State's Argument	Turner’s Argument	Held
Whether Turner was entitled to postconviction DNA testing under N.C.G.S. § 15A-269	Turner’s motion failed to show the required elements (materiality, relation to the prosecution, and test novelty or superiority); the statute places burden on movant	Turner argued the cited DNA statutes entitled him to testing and that testing was material to his defense (allegation was conclusory)	Denied: motion insufficient because Turner did not allege how testing would be material; conclusory statement alone fails § 15A-269(a)(1) burden (affirmed)
Whether the court erred by not appointing counsel under § 15A-269(c)	Appointment required only if movant shows indigence and that DNA testing may be material; because movant failed to show materiality, appointment not required	Turner argued trial court should have appointed counsel or held a hearing to determine materiality	Denied: court correctly declined appointment because Turner did not make the requisite showing of materiality necessary to trigger § 15A-269(c) (affirmed)

State v. Gardner, 742 S.E.2d 352 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (motion for postconviction DNA testing must allege how testing is material; conclusory allegations insufficient)
State v. Adcock, 310 S.E.2d 587 (N.C. 1983) (movant bears burden of proving facts supporting postconviction relief by preponderance)
State v. Foster, 729 S.E.2d 116 (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (statutory standard for DNA testing proceedings and movant’s burden)
State v. McLean, 753 S.E.2d 235 (N.C. Ct. App. 2014) (pretrial and postconviction DNA testing standards and movant obligations)
Templeton v. Town of Boone, 701 S.E.2d 709 (N.C. Ct. App. 2010) (correctness of judgment governs even if trial court gave wrong reason)
Payne v. Buffalo Reinsurance Co., 317 S.E.2d 408 (N.C. Ct. App. 1984) (same rule that a correct judgment will be upheld despite wrong reasons)