State v. Turek, 250 P.3d 796

Turek was on two years of supervised misdemeanor probation for DUI with a warrantless-search condition: submit to searches of person, residence, and property at the request of probation or law enforcement.
Two probation officers and a sheriff’s deputy conducted an initial probation home visit at approximately 12:21 p.m. on Sept. 2, 2008; no one answered at the residence but sounds and smoke were observed.
The sheriff entered an unlocked shed on the property and discovered a marijuana growing operation; Turek was not present and had not been notified of the visit or search.
Turek was charged with manufacturing marijuana and possession of drug paraphernalia and moved to suppress the shed evidence as obtained through an unconstitutional search.
The district court granted the suppression motion, and the State appealed claiming the entry was a constitutionally permissible probation visit and that the probation condition waived Fourth Amendment rights.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the probation condition requiring searches “at the request of” officers constitutes consent or requires notice.	State argues waiver in advance; no notice needed at scene.	Turek's condition requires notice for searches conducted at request, not unilateral entry.	Notice is required; search not authorized without it.
Whether entering the shed during an alleged “visit” was a lawful probation visit or an unauthorized search.	State contends it was a permissible probation visit.	Officers lacked authorization to search absent consent or notice.	Entry and search were not justified as a lawful visit.
Whether Pinson supports warrantless entry when consent was not sought or given at the scene.	State relies on Pinson to justify entry without consent.	Pinson relies on reasonable suspicion; not present here; not controlling.	Pinson is misapplied; no reasonable suspicion here.
Whether the probation consent language effectively waives Fourth Amendment rights to permit searches at any time without notice.	Consent language in Gawron/Purdum supports broad waiver.	Waiver must be interpreted to require notice and timeframe; scope limited by objective reasonableness.	Consent is limited; cannot authorize off-scene, without notice searches.

State v. Purdum, 147 Idaho 206, 207 P.3d 182 (Idaho 2009) (probation search condition waives Fourth Amendment rights but scope must be considered)
State v. Gawron, 112 Idaho 841, 736 P.2d 1295 (Idaho 1987) (probation search condition valid under waiver for warrantless searches)
State v. Buhler, 137 Idaho 685, 52 P.3d 329 (Idaho 2002) (probation search conditions analyzed for scope and consent)
State v. Hindman, 125 Or. App. 434, 866 P.2d 481 (Or. App. 1993) (probation search upon request requires notice of impending search)
People v. Mason, 5 Cal.3d 759, 488 P.2d 630 (Cal. 1971) (probation searches ‘upon request’ require notice to be valid)