State v. Turay, 532 P.3d 57

Background

Police arrested Turay after an undercover operation involving a 17‑year‑old victim (J); officers seized two cell phones from Turay’s car and obtained a warrant to search digital data on multiple phones.
The warrant listed nine discrete search categories (communications, relationship evidence, prostitution‑related communications, photos showing association with prostitution, sexually explicit images tied to ads, website use for a set period, ride‑share records, geolocation for a date range, and a catch‑all "any other evidence").
Forensic extraction produced incriminating photographs and text‑message reports from Turay’s phone; the record lacks detailed evidence about the step‑by‑step forensic process.
Turay moved to suppress under Article I, § 9 (particularity); the trial court denied suppression, and he was convicted of compelling prostitution.
The Court of Appeals found three categories constitutional and six deficient, and remanded for factual development about how the forensic search was conducted.
The Oregon Supreme Court held five of nine categories violated the particularity requirement, found a minimal factual nexus between the constitutional violation and all evidence extracted, and reversed and remanded for factual findings to determine whether the state can prove the evidence was untainted.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Turay's Argument	Held
1) What particularity standard governs warrants to search digital data?	Apply Mansor: warrant must permit a reasonable officer to identify responsive data; do not require search protocols.	Require heightened, specific limits (temporal and other) and elimination of officer discretion.	Mansor standard: warrant must describe the “what” as specifically as reasonably possible under the circumstances, including relevant temporal limits when available; but need not prescribe search protocols.
2) Were the nine search categories sufficiently particular?	Majority of challenged categories are sufficiently particular given affidavit context.	Several categories (esp. catch‑alls) are too vague and permit general rummaging.	Five of nine categories failed particularity (1st, 2nd, 7th, 8th, 9th); three (3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th — note Court treated 6th as valid earlier) satisfied it; Court clarifies which are deficient.
3) If a warrant mixes valid and invalid categories, must all seized digital evidence be suppressed?	Evidence fitting a valid category may be used if, objectively, it falls within that lawful category — do not suppress if evidence matches lawful terms.	Entire warrant is tainted by broad/invalid categories (general warrant effect); all evidence must be suppressed.	Neither categorical approach controls. Because Turay established a minimal factual nexus between the constitutional violation and the evidence, suppression is presumptively required unless the state proves the evidence was untainted.
4) On remand, what showing must the state make to overcome suppression?	Court of Appeals required proof that evidence was actually discovered while executing a lawful category.	Same; defendant urges suppression without remand.	Remand is required to develop the factual record. The Supreme Court declines to adopt a single exclusive proof method (e.g., must show evidence was found while executing a lawful command), but places the burden on the state to prove the evidence was untainted; factual proof about how the forensic search was conducted is necessary.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Mansor, 363 Or 185 (Or. 2018) (establishes particularity framework for digital searches and limits use of nonresponsive data)
Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373 (U.S. 2014) (cell phones hold qualitatively different, highly sensitive data)
State v. DeJong, 368 Or 640 (Or. 2021) (minimal factual nexus shifts burden to state to prove evidence untainted)
State v. Johnson, 335 Or 511 (Or. 2003) (warrant presumption of regularity undermined when evidence connects to prior misconduct)
State v. Trax, 335 Or 597 (Or. 2003) (particularity standard for physical‑premises warrants)
State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28 (Or. 1973) (warrant so ambiguous as to permit illegal search renders any search pursuant to it illegal)