State v. Tsujimura, 366 P.3d 173

Background

Officer Billins observed Tsujimura driving erratically on the Moanalua Freeway (straddling the lane/shoulder), activated lights/siren, and stopped him on the shoulder.
On contact Billins detected slurred speech, red/watery eyes, a strong odor of an alcoholic beverage, and inattentiveness.
Tsujimura told Billins of a prior left-knee/ACL injury and that he was taking medications; Billins did not observe limping or bandages.
Billins administered standardized field sobriety tests (HGN, walk-and-turn, one-leg-stand); Billins described observable performance problems on the psychomotor tests but the court excluded most HGN testimony for lack of foundation.
State charged Tsujimura under HRS § 291E-61(a)(1) (OVUII — under the influence of alcohol). After a bench trial the district court convicted and sentenced him; Tsujimura appealed raising challenges to the charge, evidence admission, comments about silence, and sufficiency of evidence.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Tsujimura's Argument	Held
Whether the OVUII charge was deficient for failing to define “alcohol”	The statutory definition (HRS § 291E-1) includes ethyl alcohol (ethanol), covering beer, wine, and distilled spirits; no separate definition needed in the charging instrument	“Alcohol” should be limited to the product of distillation (distilled spirits), so charge was vague/deficient and State failed to prove the specific type consumed	Rejected — statute expressly includes ethyl alcohol; charge gave fair notice and evidence supported consumption of alcohol as defined by statute
Admissibility of officer testimony about standardized field sobriety tests (FSTs)	Officer may testify to personal, lay observations of psychomotor FST performance and give lay opinion of intoxication; HGN requires a higher foundation and was limited here	Officer testimony about FSTs was improper or required scientific foundation (esp. HGN)	Rejected — psychomotor PST testimony admissible as lay observation; HGN testimony excluded when foundation lacking
Whether officer testimony that defendant did not say he couldn’t exit due to injury impermissibly commented on silence	Testimony addressed whether defendant indicated the injury affected his ability to perform FSTs, not a comment on invocation of the right to remain silent	The statement that “no statements were made” was an impermissible comment on defendant’s silence	Rejected — in context it did not target assertion of constitutional right; moreover it was a bench trial and judge presumed not influenced
Sufficiency of evidence that defendant was under the influence to impair faculties	Observed impaired driving, odor of alcohol, red/watery eyes, slurred speech, and poor FST performance collectively supplied substantial evidence of impairment	Evidence insufficient to prove impairment to a degree that met the statute’s standard	Rejected — viewed in State’s favor the evidence was substantial to support conviction

Key Cases Cited

State v. Turping, [citation="136 Hawai'i 333, 361 P.3d 1236"] (Haw. 2015) (statutory purpose of drunk-driving laws and interpretation of “alcohol” in context)
State v. Ferrer, [citation="95 Hawai'i 409, 23 P.3d 744"] (App. 2001) (distinguishing foundational requirements for HGN versus psychomotor FSTs; psychomotor tests admissible as lay observations)
Meador v. State, 674 So.2d 826 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (psychomotor FSTs within jurors’ common experience; officer observations admissible)
State v. McKnight, [citation="131 Hawai'i 379, 319 P.3d 298"] (Haw. 2013) (avoiding absurd statutory constructions)
State v. Toyomura, [citation="80 Hawai'i 8, 904 P.2d 893"] (1995) (foundation required before an officer may testify that an arrestee “failed” FSTs)
State v. Mainaaupo, [citation="117 Hawai'i 236, 178 P.3d 1"] (2008) (prohibition on using a defendant’s silence against them)
State v. Padilla, 57 Haw. 150, 552 P.2d 357 (1976) (standard for whether prosecution impermissibly commented on defendant’s silence)