State v. Trujillo, 2017 UT App 116

Police responded to an incident involving an intoxicated minor and later to a report of a man with a knife; officers found knives and two groups arguing (neighbors and a group including the minor, his brother, and Trujillo).
Officers detained the minor and his brother, told Trujillo to leave; backup officers later located and arrested Trujillo for aggravated assault and failing to stop for police after he ran into a house.
After arrest, Trujillo said several times that “if I’m being charged with [aggravated assault], my boys will be paying [them] a visit” and asked rhetorically whether he should go to jail “and nothing happen?”
The State charged Trujillo with retaliation against a witness, victim, or informant (Utah Code § 76-8-508.3(2)); Trujillo moved to quash for insufficient evidence and later objected to admission of gang-affiliation evidence.
The trial court admitted expert testimony regarding gang culture and Trujillo’s leadership/tattoo; the jury convicted and the court sentenced Trujillo to an indeterminate term not to exceed five years.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Trujillo)	Held
Whether Trujillo’s statements constituted a "threat" under § 76-8-508.3(2)	Statements were a conditional threat intended to pressure officers and intimidate neighbors	Statements were mere expressions of retaliatory feelings or confession, not threats	Affirmed: jury could reasonably find statements were threats given conditional phrasing and context
Whether a threat must be communicated directly to the witness/victim/informant (i.e., reach the target)	Statute requires the threat be "directed against" a protected person; does not require direct communication	Argues "directed against" requires communication "to" the target (threat must reach the person)	Affirmed: statute’s use of "against" does not require direct communication to the target; directing a threat suffices
Admissibility of gang-affiliation evidence (expert testimony)	Gang evidence was admissible for noncharacter purposes: to show intent, that the statement was a threat, and to provide context	Evidence was highly prejudicial character/propensity evidence and should be excluded	Affirmed: court did not abuse discretion—evidence had high probative value, was offered for a proper noncharacter purpose, limiting instruction given

State v. Cruz, 387 P.3d 618 (Utah Ct. App. 2016) (standard for reviewing sufficiency of evidence)
State v. Maestas, 299 P.3d 892 (Utah 2012) (reviewing evidence in light most favorable to verdict)
R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 100 P.3d 1159 (Utah 2004) (statutory interpretation starts with plain language)
State v. Bagnes, 322 P.3d 719 (Utah 2014) (use of dictionary in construing ordinary meaning)
State v. Gonzalez, 345 P.3d 1168 (Utah 2015) (admission of gang-affiliation evidence for noncharacter purposes)
State v. Reece, 349 P.3d 712 (Utah 2015) (framework for admitting evidence that may be character-based)
State v. Pullman, 306 P.3d 827 (Utah Ct. App. 2013) (prior-bad-act evidence inadmissible if offered solely to show character)
State v. Toki, 263 P.3d 481 (Utah Ct. App. 2011) (gang expert testimony and limits on prosecutorial use)
State v. Gallegos, 396 P.2d 414 (Utah 1964) (admitting evidence of violent conflicts between gangs not necessarily prejudicial)