89 So. 3d 340
La.2012Background
- Defendant Rudy Troselair pled guilty to sexual battery of a child under thirteen and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment,” without benefit, under prior law.
- Between 2006 and 2009 Louisiana amended La.R.S. 15:561.2 to replace five years of supervised release with lifetime supervision for qualifying offenses.
- Upon release in 2010, Troselair was placed on lifelong supervision under the amended statute.
- The amendment became effective after his plea, and he moved to challenge retroactive application as Ex Post Facto violation.
- The district court denied relief; the court of appeal vacated, holding retroactive lifetime supervision unconstitutional as applied to him.
- This Court granted the State’s writ and held the amended provisions predominantly nonpunitive, allowing retroactive application to Troselair.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether retroactive lifetime supervision violates Ex Post Facto | Troselair argues retroactive lifetime supervision is punishment | State contends regime is civil, nonpunitive | No Ex Post Facto violation; regime predominantly nonpunitive as applied to defendant |
| Whether the appellate ruling declaring retroactivity unconstitutional was proper | Appellate ruling treated retroactivity as unconstitutional | State contends court of appeal erred in treating as facially unconstitutional | Court correctly reversed, reinstating district court judgment |
| Whether the supervised release provisions are civil or punitive under Doe/Mendoza-Martinez framework | Regime serves public safety and complies with registration/notification | Regime imposes punitive restraints and sanctions | Provisions are predominantly nonpunitive; public safety rational connection supports nonpunitive characterization |
| Whether the Mendoza-Martinez seven-factor test supports nonpunitive conclusion | Factors show nonpunitive purpose and regulatory aims | Factors indicate punitive effects | Factors weigh in favor of nonpunitive conclusion given nonpunitive purpose and rational connection |
| Whether termination petitions and other conditions affect Ex Post Facto analysis | Court notes termination option exists; does not alter nonpunitive characterization |
Key Cases Cited
- Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386 (1798) (ex post facto definition and categories)
- Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925) (ex post facto principle articulation)
- Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (seven Kennedy factors guide ex post facto analysis)
- Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84 (2003) (civil/nonpunitive framework for sex offender registration)
- Olivieri v. State, 779 So.2d 735 (La. 2001) (Louisiana nonpunitive interpretation of regulatory schemes)
- Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998 (6th Cir. 2007) (doctrine for distinguishing civil regulatory schemes from punitive penalties)
- Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997) (post-incarceration confinement as nonpunitive when tied to treatment goals)
- Ursery v. United States, 518 U.S. 267 (1996) (purpose and effect analysis of civil sanctions)