State v. Troisi, 206 N.E.3d 695

Martek Pharmacal (licensed wholesale distributor), its owner, and two employees were indicted on seven counts under R.C. 2925.03(A)(1) and (2) for selling/distributing controlled substances; the indictment alleged they acted “not in accordance with Chapter 4729.”
R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) exempts actors who comply with R.C. Chapter 4729; under State v. Nucklos the state must prove noncompliance with the applicable statutory/regulatory requirements as an element of trafficking when an exemption is claimed.
The bill of particulars and discovery did not identify the specific section(s) of Chapter 4729 the state relied on; the prosecution advanced shifting theories (e.g., invoking R.C. 4729.291 applicable to prescribers and later administrative rules that postdated the indictment period).
The trial court dismissed the indictment with prejudice for failing to provide constitutionally adequate notice of the nature and cause of the accusations.
The Eighth District reversed, holding a chapter-level allegation plus discovery/bill of particulars could suffice; one judge dissented over the prosecution’s vague, shifting theories.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding due process requires identification of the specific Chapter 4729 provision(s) that render a wholesale distributor noncompliant and directing dismissal without prejudice (state may reindict).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether due-process notice requires identification of specific R.C. 4729 provision(s) when charging a wholesale distributor under R.C. 2925.03(A)	General allegation that defendants acted “not in accordance with Chapter 4729,” together with bill of particulars/discovery, provides sufficient notice	Indictment must specify which section(s) of Chapter 4729 were violated so defendants can prepare a defense	The state must identify the specific section(s) of R.C. Chapter 4729 (in the indictment or by subsequent elucidation); a mere chapter-level allegation is inadequate
Whether a bill of particulars or discovery can cure the omission	Bill of particulars/discovery can cure an otherwise nonspecific indictment	The bill here failed to identify any specific Chapter 4729 provision and did not cure the notice defect; defendants were prejudiced	A bill of particulars must identify the underlying statutory/regulatory basis; here it did not and did not cure the indictment’s defect
Whether dismissal should be with prejudice	Dismissal with prejudice was improper; reversal was warranted	Prejudice justified dismissal with prejudice because of constitutional notice failure	Trial court erred to dismiss with prejudice; dismissal must be without prejudice so the state may reindict

State v. Nucklos, 904 N.E.2d 512 (Ohio 2009) (when exemption under R.C. 2925.03(B)(1) is implicated, the state must prove noncompliance as an element)
State v. Sellards, 478 N.E.2d 781 (Ohio 1985) (bill of particulars purpose is to elucidate the charged conduct and ensure adequate notice)
State v. Childs, 728 N.E.2d 379 (Ohio 2000) (indictment must allege sufficient specifics when statute requires a particular overt act or element)
State v. Buehner, 853 N.E.2d 1162 (Ohio 2006) (an indictment that tracks statutory language and cites a predicate statute number will generally provide adequate notice)
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974) (constitutional standard for an indictment: must contain elements and fairly inform defendant of the charge)