State v. Trey M., 383 P.3d 474

Background

Trey M., a high-school juvenile in counseling, told his therapist he planned to obtain a gun and kill three classmates and then himself; therapist reported threats to law enforcement.
Trey repeated detailed plans to a deputy, describing means, targets, and motive (bullying/suspension).
State charged Trey with three counts of felony harassment (threat to kill) under RCW 9A.46.020; he was convicted and appealed.
On appeal, Trey and amicus ACLU argued Washington must adopt a subjective intent (speaker-focused) true-threat standard, citing Elonis and Virginia v. Black.
The Washington Supreme Court accepted a certified question asking whether Elonis requires abandoning Washington’s objective (reasonable-person) true-threat test.
The court affirmed Trey’s convictions, holding Elonis does not alter Washington precedent and that sufficient evidence supported true-threat findings under the objective test.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Elonis requires Washington to abandon its objective reasonable-person true-threat test in favor of a subjective intent standard	Elonis and Black compel a subjective intent requirement for true-threat prosecutions	Washington’s harassment statute already includes both a subjective element ("knowingly threatens") and an objective element (reasonable fear), and Elonis did not address First Amendment true-threat doctrine	Elonis is a statutory-construction decision limited to 18 U.S.C. §875(c); it does not require Washington to abandon its objective test; court retains reasonable-person standard
Whether Virginia v. Black requires a subjective-intent rule for all true-threat prosecutions	Black’s emphasis on intent to intimidate mandates subjective intent for true threats	Black concerned a statute with an explicit intent presumption; its plurality nature and factual differences mean it doesn’t mandate overturning Washington precedent	Black does not compel change; Washington’s objective test remains valid and applicable
Sufficiency of evidence that Trey’s statements constituted felony harassment under RCW 9A.46.020	Trey’s disclosures in therapy were therapeutic and not intended as threats; insufficient evidence that victims were reasonably afraid or that the threats were communicated to them	Detailed plan, changed demeanor, repetition to deputy, and victims’ testimony that they were scared support true-threat and reasonable-fear elements	Evidence was sufficient: victims testified they were scared; context, specificity, and demeanor supported a finding a reasonable speaker would foresee the statements would be interpreted as threats
Whether statements to a therapist (and later to police) can be treated as true threats	Statements made in counseling are protected therapeutic disclosures absent proof of intent to threaten	Statements may be true threats depending on totality of circumstances; therapeutic context alone does not preclude liability	Therapeutic context is relevant but not determinative; here facts supported true-threat findings under Washington’s objective standard

Key Cases Cited

Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (U.S. 2015) (statutory-construction holding that §875(c) requires proof of defendant’s subjective mens rea; Court declined to address First Amendment true-threat doctrine)
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (U.S. 2003) (plurality and concurring opinions addressing cross-burning statute and intent-to-intimidate requirement; Court held state may proscribe cross burning intended to intimidate but struck down prima facie presumption)
State v. Williams, 144 Wn.2d 197 (Wash. 2001) (adopted Washington’s objective reasonable-person test for true threats)
State v. J.M., 144 Wn.2d 472 (Wash. 2001) (interpreting RCW 9A.46.020: perpetrator must knowingly threaten; victim must find out; words must place victim in reasonable fear)
State v. Kilburn, 151 Wn.2d 36 (Wash. 2004) (reaffirmed objective reasonable-person test; held state need not prove speaker intended to carry out threat)
State v. Schaler, 169 Wn.2d 274 (Wash. 2010) (distinguished Black; held true-threat inquiry is context-dependent and for the factfinder)
United States v. White, 810 F.3d 212 (4th Cir. 2016) (interpreting Elonis as a statutory ruling limited to §875(c) and recognizing continued viability of the reasonable-recipient/contextual true-threat inquiry)