State v. Trammell, 2016 NMSC 30

In 2004 Trammell pled guilty (plea agreement) to several offenses including false imprisonment of a minor; at that time such a conviction triggered SORNA sex-offender registration.
The district court’s standard judgment form contained a checklist item for sex-offender registration but the box was not checked; plea counsel also did not advise Trammell that the plea carried SORNA registration.
Trammell served prison time, was released to sex-offender probation and registered under SORNA; two years later he was arrested for battering his girlfriend’s 14-year-old son and the State moved to revoke probation and impose habitual-offender time.
Trammell moved to withdraw his 2004 plea in 2010, arguing plea counsel was ineffective for failing to advise him of the SORNA registration consequence; he relied on State v. Edwards (Court of Appeals) holding such failures are per se deficient under Strickland.
The district court denied the motion; the Court of Appeals reversed (applied Edwards retroactively and found deficient performance and prejudice), and the State sought certiorari. The New Mexico Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Supreme Court held counsel’s failure to advise was per se deficient (Strickland prong one) and Edwards applies retroactively, but Trammell failed to prove Strickland prejudice, so his motion to withdraw the plea was properly denied.

Issue	State's Argument	Trammell's Argument	Held
Whether Edwards (attorney must advise of SORNA consequences) applies retroactively to a 2004 plea	Edwards announced a new rule and should not apply retroactively	Edwards reflects existing law and professional norms and should apply retroactively	Edwards applies retroactively (not a new rule)
Whether counsel’s failure to advise of SORNA registration is deficient performance under Strickland prong one	Not deficient if Edwards not retroactive	Such failure is per se deficient (analogous to immigration advisals)	Failure to advise is per se deficient (prong one satisfied)
Whether Trammell suffered Strickland prejudice (prong two) — would he have rejected the plea and proceeded to trial or obtained a non‑SORNA plea?	State: no reasonable probability he would have rejected plea; evidence is self‑serving and prosecution would likely not have offered a materially better deal	Trammell: he and counsel testified he would have refused/renegotiated had he known; plea counsel would have tried for a different deal	No prejudice shown: Trammell’s testimony/self‑serving evidence insufficient; he acquiesced to SORNA for years and only challenged after revocation
Remedy: whether plea should be withdrawn	Because of deficient performance, plea should be withdrawable	Trammell sought withdrawal and reformation to standard probation	Denied — remand to reinstate district court denial of motion to withdraw plea

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishes two‑prong ineffective assistance test)
State v. Paredez, 101 P.3d 799 (N.M. 2004) (failure to advise of immigration consequences is per se deficient under Strickland prong one)
State v. Edwards, 157 P.3d 56 (N.M. Ct. App. 2007) (Court of Appeals: counsel’s failure to advise of SORNA consequences is deficient)
State v. Ramirez, 333 P.3d 240 (N.M. 2014) (Ramirez II) (retroactivity analysis applying Paredez retroactively; guidance on when a rule is new)
State v. Moore, 86 P.3d 635 (N.M. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizes that pre‑plea knowledge of SORNA consequences ought to be part of procedure)
State v. Trammell, 336 P.3d 977 (N.M. Ct. App. 2014) (Court of Appeals decision below reversing the district court and remanding to allow plea withdrawal)