State v. Tramell E. Starks
2013 WI 69
| Wis. | 2013Background
- In 2005 Lee Weddle was murdered; Tramell Starks was tried, convicted of first‑degree reckless homicide (lesser‑included) and felon‑in‑possession, and sentenced to 36 years plus extended supervision.
- On direct appeal Starks (through appellate counsel Robert Kagen) raised four issues; the court of appeals affirmed and the Supreme Court denied review.
- Starks later filed a pro se Wis. Stat. § 974.06 motion alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel for failing to raise ineffective‑trial‑counsel claims; he also filed a Cherry motion to vacate a DNA surcharge. The circuit court denied the § 974.06 motion on the merits; the court of appeals affirmed on procedural grounds (treating the Cherry motion as a prior motion). This Court granted review.
- The Supreme Court found procedural complexity: Starks had alleged ineffective appellate counsel but filed in circuit court under § 974.06 (postconviction counsel claims belong in circuit court; appellate counsel claims must be brought initially by habeas in the court of appeals per Knight). The error affected competency, not jurisdiction, so the Court reached the merits.
- The Court held: (1) Cherry (sentence‑modification) motions are distinct from § 974.06 motions and do not bar later § 974.06 relief; (2) where habeas alleges appellate counsel was ineffective for omitting issues, the defendant must show the omitted issues were "clearly stronger" than those actually raised; and (3) applying that standard, Starks failed to show appellate counsel was ineffective, so relief was denied and the court of appeals affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Starks' Argument | State's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a Cherry motion counts as a "prior motion" under § 974.06(4) (i.e., bars later § 974.06 relief) | Cherry motion should suffice to raise issues and thus bar later § 974.06 filing | Cherry motions are sentence‑modification actions distinct from § 974.06; they cannot be treated as prior § 974.06 motions | Cherry motions are distinct from § 974.06 motions and do not bar a later § 974.06 motion |
| Proper forum: whether ineffective‑appellate‑counsel claims may be brought under § 974.06 in circuit court | Starks filed under § 974.06 in circuit court | Such claims must be brought as a habeas petition in the court of appeals per Knight | Ineffective‑appellate‑counsel claims belong in a court of appeals habeas petition; Starks’ filing in circuit court was procedurally incorrect but affected competency, not jurisdiction, so merits review was appropriate |
| Pleading/bench‑mark for appellate counsel omissions (deficiency prong) | Need only show appellate counsel was deficient and prejudice under Strickland | Must show omitted claims were "clearly stronger" than those raised (adopting Robbins/Gray standard) | For habeas claims alleging appellate counsel failed to raise issues, defendant must show the omitted issues were "clearly stronger" than those actually presented |
| Whether Kagen (appellate counsel) was ineffective for not raising specific trial‑counsel claims | Starks identified failures: not calling Mills, not calling Anderson, not investigating "Junebug" phone records, not calling father/grandmother | The omitted claims were unsubstantiated, previously adjudicated, speculative, or weak compared to issues raised on direct appeal | Kagen was not ineffective: the unraised claims were not "clearly stronger" than those raised; habeas relief denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Escalona‑Naranjo v. State, 185 Wis. 2d 168 (1994) (describing § 974.06(4) limits on successive postconviction claims and the need for "sufficient reason" to raise issues later)
- Knight v. State, 168 Wis. 2d 509 (1992) (holding ineffective‑appellate‑counsel claims must be brought initially as a habeas petition in the court of appeals)
- Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259 (2000) (adopting the "clearly stronger" standard when appellate counsel omitted particular issues)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishing two‑prong test for ineffective assistance: deficiency and prejudice)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. 1388 (2011) (discussing limits on rigid rules in ineffective‑assistance jurisprudence; analyzed in relation to pleading standards)
- State v. Cherry, 312 Wis. 2d 203 (Ct. App. 2008) (holding that courts must articulate a rational decision‑making process before imposing DNA surcharge; defines Cherry motions)