State v. Torres, 948 N.W.2d 288

Complaint charging Torres with criminal mischief filed Sept. 14, 2017; initial notice mailed to a Kearney address was returned with a forwarded Sioux City address.
Court docketed a September 26 notice that the arraignment was continued at Torres’ request to Oct. 25, 2017; the notice lists both Sioux City and Kearney addresses and contains no certificate of service.
Torres did not appear on Oct. 25; court accepted the State’s probable cause statement and issued a bench warrant; Torres was arrested on that warrant Feb. 28, 2019.
Torres moved for absolute discharge (speedy-trial violation) on May 7, 2019; county court denied the motion by excluding Sept. 27–Oct. 25 (continuance) and Oct. 25, 2017–Feb. 28, 2019 (defendant absent/unavailable); district court affirmed.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals held the State failed to prove Torres had notice of the Oct. 25 hearing and that the county court improperly relied on judicially noticed personal knowledge of clerk/bailiff practice; the court reversed and remanded with directions to dismiss.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Torres)	Held
Whether Sept. 27–Oct. 25, 2017 (continuance requested by defendant) is excludable under § 29‑1207(4)(b)	Excludable because continuance was requested by Torres	Torres effectively conceded this period should be excluded	Held excludable (parties and courts treated it as excluded)
Whether Oct. 25, 2017–Feb. 28, 2019 (failure to appear → arrest on bench warrant) is excludable as defendant’s absence/unavailability or for good cause under § 29‑1207(4)(d)	Excludable because Torres failed to appear and was unavailable until arrested	Not excludable: State failed to prove Torres received notice of the rescheduled Oct. 25 hearing, so absence cannot toll speedy‑trial time	Held not excludable: State failed to prove notice by a preponderance; exclusion improper
Whether the county court could judicially notice that the notice was mailed based on the court’s knowledge of clerk/bailiff procedures	Judicial notice of court mailing practice is permissible (court knowledge of its own rules/procedures)	Judicial notice of the specific fact that notice was sent was improper extrajudicial/personal knowledge	Held judicial notice of that mailing fact was improper; court relied on personal knowledge beyond permissible judicial notice

State v. Lovvorn, 303 Neb. 844, 932 N.W.2d 64 (Neb. 2019) (statutory speedy‑trial framework and exclusions under § 29‑1207)
State v. Beitel, 296 Neb. 781, 895 N.W.2d 710 (Neb. 2017) (State bears burden to prove excluded periods by a preponderance)
State v. Vela‑Montes, 287 Neb. 679, 844 N.W.2d 286 (Neb. 2014) (speedy‑trial statutes interpreted and applied)
State v. Richter, 240 Neb. 223, 481 N.W.2d 200 (Neb. 1992) (defendant must be properly notified before failure to appear can toll speedy‑trial time)
State v. Vejvoda, 231 Neb. 668, 438 N.W.2d 461 (Neb. 1989) (limitations on judicial notice; judge’s personal knowledge is not judicial notice)
Simmons v. Murray, 189 Neb. 695, 204 N.W.2d 800 (Neb. 1973) (court may judicially notice its rules when properly filed)
Geiss v. Geiss, 20 Neb. App. 861, 835 N.W.2d 774 (Neb. Ct. App. 2013) (judicial notice of local court rules permitted when filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court)
State v. McGinn, 303 Neb. 224, 928 N.W.2d 391 (Neb. 2019) (standard of review for county‑court appeals to district court)