State v. Tomas Jaymitchell Hoyle, 987 N.W.2d 732

Victim (pseudonym "Hannah"), age 15 at time of events, testified that Hoyle sexually assaulted her in a car; State presented only the victim and an investigator at trial.
Hoyle exercised his Fifth Amendment right and did not testify; the defense presented no witnesses.
Before trial the prosecutor obtained permission to describe the State's evidence as “uncontroverted” in closing; during closing he repeatedly called the victim’s testimony uncontroverted and urged the jury to decide only on evidence presented and not speculation.
Jury convicted Hoyle on all counts; he received postconviction relief denial from the circuit court.
The court of appeals reversed, holding the prosecutor’s repeated use of “uncontroverted” violated Griffin v. California by effectively commenting on Hoyle’s silence; the Wisconsin Supreme Court granted review and reversed the court of appeals.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Hoyle)	Held
Whether describing the State's evidence as “uncontroverted” during closing improperly commented on Hoyle’s silence in violation of Griffin	The prosecutor’s remarks were not a comment on silence but a permissible reminder that the jury must decide only from evidence presented; context (jury instructions and defense counsel’s opening) made that clear	Saying the victim’s testimony was “uncontroverted” implicitly pointed to Hoyle’s silence because only he could have contradicted her account	No Griffin violation — remarks, read in context, were not "manifestly intended" nor of such character that the jury would "naturally and necessarily" take them as comment on silence; prosecutor focused on permitted evidence, not penalizing silence
Standard for indirect/comment-on-silence claims	The Morrison formulation should govern and context determines whether a comment is a forbidden reference to silence	The Morrison standard applies and, since only Hoyle could rebut the victim, characterizing testimony as uncontroverted was an indirect, adverse comment on silence	Adopted Morrison test: prosecutor language must be (1) manifestly intended or (2) of such character that jury would naturally and necessarily view it as comment on failure to testify; it also must be adverse and not a fair response to defense. Applying that test, the Court found the elements unmet here

Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (Fifth Amendment forbids prosecution or court comment that defendant's silence is evidence of guilt)
Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333 (1978) (Griffin concerns adverse comment that silence is evidence of guilt; court may give no-adverse-inference instruction)
Morrison v. United States, 6 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1925) (test for indirect comments: was language manifestly intended or of such character the jury would naturally and necessarily take it as comment on defendant's failure to testify)
Wilson v. United States, 149 U.S. 60 (1893) (statutory-era precedent holding prosecutor comment on defendant's failure to testify undermines presumption of innocence)
United States v. Hastings, 461 U.S. 499 (1983) (addressed prosecutor remarks about what defendants did not do; court resolved on harmless-error grounds and explored limits of indirect-comment doctrine)
United States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25 (1988) (prosecutor's reference to defendant's opportunity to testify may be a fair response to defense argument)
United States v. Cotnam, 88 F.3d 487 (7th Cir. 1996) (holding that labeling evidence "uncontroverted" can violate Griffin when only defendant could have contradicted it)