State v. Todd
2013 UT App 231
| Utah Ct. App. | 2013Background
- In 2001 Shayne Todd was convicted of murder (jury) and guilty-pleaded to possessing a dangerous weapon; court sentenced him to 5 years-to-life for murder and 1–15 years for the weapon offense, to run consecutively.
- Adult Probation and Parole’s sentencing report estimated Todd would serve ~26.5 years under the Utah Sentence and Release Guidelines (the Guidelines).
- At Todd’s 2001 parole hearing he was told his next parole hearing would not occur until 2029, implying at least ~28 years’ incarceration; the Board later issued a “Special Attention Review” maintaining the 2029 date and listing the murder sentence as “5–100 years.”
- Todd filed a pro se Rule 22(e) motion arguing the Board altered his sentence (making it illegal) and violated due process; the district court denied the motion.
- On appeal the Utah Court of Appeals reviewed the legality of the sentence and affirmed the district court, concluding the Board did not alter the sentence and that Rule 22(e) was not available to relitigate parole timing or Guidelines-related expectations.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Board’s numerical listing ("5–100 years") altered Todd’s indeterminate sentence so as to be illegal | Board’s listing modified the sentence beyond statutory range and thus made it illegal | Board merely used a numerical computation for parole eligibility; it did not change the sentence | The listing was a computation for parole purposes and did not alter the sentence; no illegal sentence existed |
| Whether the Board exceeded its authority by setting a determinate term within an indeterminate sentence (separation-of-powers/constitutional challenge) | Board’s action violated Utah Constitution and impermissibly exercised sentencing power | Board’s parole-setting is an exercise of its constitutional pardon/parole authority distinct from judicial sentencing | Rejected; precedent holds Board’s parole power to fix parole dates does not constitute unconstitutional sentencing |
| Whether the Board’s action violated due process by setting parole beyond Guidelines’ recommendation | Board’s postponement deprived Todd of due process expectations created by the Guidelines | Guidelines are nonbinding; any expectation of release from them is tenuous | Court declined to reach merits; Guidelines-based challenges are not proper via Rule 22(e); other procedural routes exist |
| Whether Rule 22(e) may be used to correct the asserted illegality | Todd sought Rule 22(e) relief asserting sentence illegality | State argued Rule 22(e) is narrow and cannot be used to attack the conviction or parole decisions improperly | Rule 22(e) did not apply because there was no illegal sentence to correct; appeal limited to sentence legality |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 854 (Utah Ct. App. 2004) (standard for reviewing sentence legality)
- State v. Telford, 48 P.3d 228 (Utah 2002) (Rule 22(e) is narrowly circumscribed)
- Padilla v. Board of Pardons, 947 P.2d 664 (Utah 1997) (Board’s parole-setting power is distinct from judicial sentencing)
- State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985) (courts defer to Board for computing numerical terms of life sentences)
- State v. Jaramillo, 481 P.2d 394 (Utah 1971) (practical difficulties in assigning numerical maxima to life terms; Board role)
- State v. Candedo, 232 P.3d 1008 (Utah 2010) (Rule 22(e) cannot be used as a veiled challenge to conviction)
- Preece v. House, 886 P.2d 508 (Utah 1994) (Guidelines lack force of law; expectations of release are tenuous)
- Renn v. Board of Pardons, 904 P.2d 677 (Utah 1995) (proper procedures for challenging postponement of parole hearings)