State v. Tirey, 2010 MT 283

Tirey abused a young woman in 1996; pled guilty to felony sexual assault and received a 50-year term with 25 years suspended.
Tirey was required to register as a Sexual Offender, but the court did not specify a tier level at sentencing.
Tirey was paroled in 2004; parole revoked in 2005 and he returned to prison to complete the unsuspended portion.
On April 15, 2008, DOC designated Tirey as a Level I Sexual Offender in anticipation of discharge; released to serve suspended portion on November 10, 2008.
Nov. 12, 2008, Tirey’s probation terms required employment, weekly reporting, and initiation of treatment within two weeks.
Tirey failed to attend treatment appointments in November 2008, missed multiple weeks, and was cited as non-compliant; he did not report as directed and failed to complete job logs.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Abuse of discretion in revoking probation	Tirey contends noncompliance was not willful and merits alternatives to incarceration.	State asserts multiple violations show willful noncompliance warranting revocation.	No abuse; court properly revoked probation for willful violations.
Incorporation of 13 new probation conditions	Tirey argues added conditions expand punishment beyond original sentence.	State argues new conditions are non-punitive or rehabilitative and within authority.	Overall sentence remains within statutory parameters; integration is permissible.
Designation of Tirey as Level II Sexual Offender at revocation	District court did not designate level II; DOC had authority to designate.	Court designated Level II at revocation.	Court erred; DOC designation of Level II was improper.
Credit for time spent on probation	Timely credit must be expressly considered and stated with reasons for denial.	Judgment included reasons aligning with prior Hardy precedent; denial proper.	Court acted within statutory parameters in denying credit; reasons stated.

State v. Rudolph, 326 Mont. 132, 107 P.3d 496 (2005 MT) (abuse of discretion standard for revocation; sentencing parameters)
State v. Senn, 314 Mont. 348, 66 P.3d 288 (2003 MT) (willful noncompliance and alternatives to incarceration)
State v. Lee, 306 Mont. 173, 31 P.3d 998 (2001 MT) (State-caused noncompliance may trigger alternatives to incarceration)
State v. Tracy, 327 Mont. 220, 113 P.3d 297 (2005 MT) (whether revocation sentence is same or lesser than original)
State v. White, 348 Mont. 196, 199 P.3d 274 (2008 MT) (analysis of whether revocation sentence is 'the same' after new conditions)
State v. Brister, 308 Mont. 154, 41 P.3d 314 (2002 MT) (limitations on adding new conditions at revocation)
State v. Rudolph, 326 Mont. 132, 107 P.3d 496 (2005 MT) (reaffirmation of punishment analysis in revocation context)
State v. Mount, 317 Mont. 481, 78 P.3d 829 (2003 MT) (ex post facto test for sentencing consequences)
State v. Hardy, 278 Mont. 516, 926 P.2d 700 (1996 MT) (requirement to state reasons for denial of credit ('street time'))