State v. Tindell, 10 A.3d 1203

Background

Defendant Omar Tindell and Hassan Reeds were charged in Essex County with multiple offenses including first-degree murder conspiracy and related crimes; Reeds was charged identically except for terroristic threats.
Jury convicted Tindell of second-degree reckless manslaughter (as a lesser-included murder), third-degree receiving stolen property, third-degree possession of cocaine, one count of unlawful possession of a weapon, and one count of terroristic threats; other charges were acquitted.
Trial evidence showed Tindell threatened and confronted students at a high school, displayed a handgun, fled the scene, and was later found with a weapon and cocaine in a Chrysler; officers testified to threat-induced violence and Tindell’s statements.
The trial court sentenced Tindell to five consecutive maximum terms totaling 30 years with 18.5 years of parole ineligibility (NERA applied to some counts).
We vacated/reversed certain convictions, remanded for acquittal on receiving stolen property, remanded for a new trial on terroristic threats, and remanded for resentencing before a different judge; no cross-appeal relief was entered on other counts.
This appeal challenged (1) identity/knowledge issues regarding the stolen Chrysler, (2) terroristic threats instruction defects, (3) whether joyriding should have been charged as a lesser-included offense, (4) juror-bias safeguards, and (5) sentencing errors stemming from perceived jury cowardice.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Stolen vehicle identity and knowledge	State argued the white Chrysler was Kalantarov's stolen car, making Tindell liable for receiving stolen property.	Tindell contends the State failed to prove the Chrysler in his possession was the stolen vehicle Kalantarov reported stolen or that he knew it was stolen.	Conviction for third-degree receiving stolen property vacated; remanded for judgment of acquittal.
Terroristic threats victim identification	State claims threats targeted identifiable persons; proof sufficient as stated in charge.	Charge lacked victim specificity, risking patchwork verdicts.	Conviction for third-degree terroristic threats reversed and remanded for a new trial.
Joyriding as a lesser-included offense	State maintains joyriding could be encompassed in receiving stolen property.	Should have been charged as a lesser-included offense and submitted to jury.	Mooted by vacatur/remand on the related receiving-stolen-property issue.
Juror publicity safeguards	Publicity and juror exposure were adequately managed; no reversal warranted.	Court failed to conduct thorough inquiry into juror exposure to adverse publicity.	Court acted reasonably; no new voir dire required; no reversible error found.
Sentencing biased and improper	Judge impermissibly implied jurors were cowards and allowed bias to taint sentence.	Sentence was improperly influenced by disdain for the jury's verdict.	Sentence vacated; remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Hodde, 181 N.J. 375 (2004) (elements of receiving stolen property including knowledge or belief of theft)
State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) (standard for judgment of acquittal; sufficiency review)
State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161 (2010) (unanimity and avoidance of fragmented verdicts; no direct unanimity instruction required in some contexts)
State v. Moffa, 42 N.J. 258 (1964) (standard for appellate review of acquittal motions)
State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281 (1981) (importance of proper jury charges in fair trials)
In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970) (beyond a reasonable doubt standard)
State v. Bey, 112 N.J. 45 (1988) (midtrial publicity and juror questioning cautions)
State v. Scherzer, 301 N.J. Super. 363 (1997) (juror exposure to irregular influences and remedial measures)
State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334 (1984) (standards for appellate review of sentencing decisions)