State v. Thompson, 521 P.3d 64

Thompson pled no contest in 2007 to manufacturing child pornography (second-degree felony) and received a nine-year basic sentence suspended in part, plus an indeterminate 5–20 year supervised parole term under the sex-offender parole statute.
After probation violations he served the basic prison term; his basic sentence expired July 2013 but he remained incarcerated until November 2013 serving "in-house" parole; thereafter his parole time alternated between community parole and in-house parole following parole revocations.
Thompson sought a statutorily required duration-review hearing after five years of supervised parole; the parole board told him that the five-year period must be an uninterrupted term in the community.
He filed habeas corpus in district court requesting a duration-review hearing (or release). The district court ordered a duration-review hearing, ruling that the statutory phrase "initial five years of supervised parole" (2004 §31-21-10.1(B)) includes parole time served in prison or other institutions as well as in the community.
The New Mexico Supreme Court affirmed: it held that the "initial five years" includes all time served during the parole sentence (in-house, institutional, or community), applied the rule of lenity in Thompson's favor, and declined to address a constitutional challenge Thompson raised for the first time on appeal.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (Thompson)	Defendant's Argument (State)	Held
Whether "initial five years of supervised parole" includes in-house (institutional) parole	In-house parole counts toward the five years; Thompson therefore is entitled to a duration-review hearing	"Parole" means release to the community per statutory definition, so only community parole counts toward the five-year eligibility	Yes. The Court held the phrase includes all time served on the parole sentence—in prison, in a rehabilitative institution, or in the community
Whether any statutory ambiguity should be resolved for the defendant (rule of lenity)	Ambiguities should be resolved for Thompson to afford the review hearing	The statute is plain: "parole" means release to the community; no lenity needed	Court applied rule of lenity to resolve doubts in Thompson's favor because the statutory scheme and history left room for ambiguity
Whether the Court should rule on Thompson's facial constitutional challenge to §31-21-10.1(B)	§31-21-10.1(B) is facially unconstitutional (raised in answer brief)	Procedural posture bars new constitutional attack raised for first time on appeal	Court declined to address constitutional claim because it was not properly before the Court (raised first in appellee’s brief)

Brock v. Sullivan, 105 N.M. 412, 733 P.2d 860 (N.M. 1987) (parole periods may run while an inmate serves consecutive sentences; recognizes in-house parole)
Gillespie v. State, 107 N.M. 455, 760 P.2d 147 (N.M. 1988) (acknowledges parole may be served in prison in the context of consecutive sentences)
State v. Maestas, 140 N.M. 836, 149 P.3d 933 (N.M. 2007) (statutory interpretation principles; avoid formalistic constructions)
State v. Johnson, 147 N.M. 177, 218 P.3d 863 (N.M. 2009) (defined-term rule: use statutory definitions when provided)
Morris v. Brandenburg, 376 P.3d 836 (N.M. 2016) (courts may rely on statutory definitions unless they lead to unreasonable results)
State v. Ogden, 118 N.M. 234, 880 P.2d 845 (N.M. 1994) (rule of lenity discussed for ambiguous criminal statutes)
United States v. Granderson, 511 U.S. 39 (U.S. 1994) (rule of lenity applied where text, structure, history leave doubt)
United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507 (U.S. 2008) (rule of lenity principle: "tie must go to the defendant")
United States v. R.L.C., 503 U.S. 291 (U.S. 1992) (lenity applies in sentencing ambiguities)