30 A.3d 671
Vt.2011Background
- Defendant, a Massachusetts resident, was charged in Vermont with lewd or lascivious conduct with a child based on a 2007 incident.
- In 2009, he pled no contest to a misdemeanor amended charge under a plea agreement that allowed residency in Massachusetts during probation, subject to probation approval.
- The sentence imposed (one-to-twelve months, all suspended) was paired with probation and sex-offender conditions, including a residence in Massachusetts.
- Ten days after sentencing, defendant moved to withdraw his plea or strike a probation condition hindering his ability to live at home; the court struck the sentence and continued for 30 days to permit alternative housing in Massachusetts, contingent on DOC approval.
- Massachusetts officials later refused to approve housing, leaving defendant effectively unable to reside at home; efforts to obtain relief continued through September 2009.
- In November 2009, the State opposed the motion on merits but did not raise jurisdictional objections; the district court dismissed the motion on jurisdictional grounds, concluding defendant was in custody under sentence.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the State can belatedly challenge the July 2 order on lack of jurisdiction. | State asserts lack of subject matter jurisdiction to entertain the motion. | Defendant contends the court had jurisdiction to hear the motion as a form of sentence reconsideration. | State's belated challenge is insufficient; remand to address merits. |
| Whether the July 2 order was a valid exercise of sentence modification/reconsideration. | Majority: the order was a permissible form of relief within §7042(a) and Rule 35(b). | Dissent contends the court improperly vacated the sentence and could not do so under these avenues. | The July 2 order was within the court's discretion; the merits must be considered on remand. |
| Whether the district court’s later dismissal was proper given custody status and Rule 32(d). | State argues the court lacked jurisdiction due to defendant being in custody; but the order should be treated as a valid relief. | Defendant argues jurisdiction was lacking because custody persisted, barring withdrawal motion. | Jurisdiction was not properly defeated; remand for merits review. |
| What standard applies to evaluating a post-sentencing motion to withdraw a plea in this unusual posture (manifest injustice vs fair and just reason). | Standard should be determined on remand given the unusual posture. | Standard may be limited to fair and just reason or manifest injustice depending on timing and post-sentencing context. | District court should decide which standard applies in the first instance. |
Key Cases Cited
- In re B.C., 169 Vt. 1 (1999) (limits collateral attacks on judgments by recognizing core subject matter jurisdiction plus ancillary limits)
- State v. Hance, 157 Vt. 222 (1991) (plea-based sentences may be modified under Rule 35 but not always; limited usefulness when plea agreement involved)
- State v. Sodaro, 2005 VT 67 (2005) (sentence reconsideration is not for post-incarceration matters)
- State v. Wargo, 168 Vt. 231 (1998) (proper avenue for post-sentencing relief for in-custody defendants is PCR)
- State v. Brooks, 170 Vt. 597 (2000) (lack of jurisdiction to entertain motion when in custody; prohibition on vacating sentence via improper channels)
- Cooley v. State, 135 Vt. 409 (1977) (limitations on district court jurisdiction to entertain post-conviction motions to avoid conflicts with PCR statute)
