State v. Thompson, 83 A.3d 388

Background

Daniel C. Thompson was convicted in district (circuit) court of third-offense DWI and sentenced with enhanced penalties based on prior convictions admitted at sentencing, resulting in a Class A misdemeanor conviction.
The State did not introduce evidence of the prior convictions at trial; they were offered at sentencing to enhance punishment.
Thompson first appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court on the enhancement issue; the Supreme Court affirmed his Class A conviction in State v. Thompson, 164 N.H. 447 (2012).
After that appeal, Thompson sought a de novo jury trial in superior court (RSA 599:1); the trial court ruled that his prior election to appeal directly to the Supreme Court precluded a superior-court jury appeal under RSA 502-A:12.
Thompson petitioned the superior court under RSA 599:1-b, claiming mistake prevented timely pursuit of a misdemeanor appeal; the superior court denied the petition without a hearing.
Thompson appealed both the trial court’s ruling (deeming waiver of jury trial) and the superior court’s denial of his RSA 599:1-b petition; the Supreme Court affirmed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Thompson)	Held
1. Does RSA 502-A:12 permit a defendant to appeal to the Supreme Court and still obtain a de novo jury trial in superior court?	RSA 502-A:12 requires a choice; if no superior-court appeal is taken, direct appeal to Supreme Court is allowed.	Thompson argued he needed to appeal to the Supreme Court first to determine whether his conviction truly was Class A (entitling him to a jury trial), so he should not be barred from subsequently seeking a de novo jury trial.	Held: RSA 502-A:12 requires an election; appealing directly to the Supreme Court precludes later pursuit of a superior-court jury trial.
2. Did Thompson validly waive his constitutional right to a jury trial by appealing to the Supreme Court?	The statutory "deemed waiver" is a permissible procedural regulation and does not violate the State or Federal Constitution.	Thompson argued he did not intentionally, knowingly, or intelligently waive his jury right and no colloquy occurred.	Held: The deemed waiver is constitutionally permissible; election to appeal to the Supreme Court constitutes a valid (deemed) waiver.
3. Does precedent or federal law require a personal colloquy to establish waiver when the waiver arises from an appellate election?	For two-tier systems, cases (e.g., Bousquet, Preston, Ludwig) allow deemed waiver and no personal colloquy is required in this context.	Thompson relied on Hewitt and similar cases to argue a personal waiver colloquy is required.	Held: Hewitt is distinguishable; no colloquy required for election-based (deemed) waiver in this two-tier appellate context.
4. Did the superior court abuse discretion by denying an RSA 599:1-b petition without a hearing (claiming mistake, accident, or misfortune)?	Because the deemed waiver is legally valid, denial without a hearing was not an unsustainable exercise of discretion.	Thompson argued his failure to pursue the superior-court appeal resulted from mistake and entitled him to an evidentiary hearing under RSA 599:1-b.	Held: Superior court did not abuse discretion; denial without hearing was proper given the legal validity of the deemed waiver.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Thompson, 164 N.H. 447 (N.H. 2012) (prior appeal affirming enhanced Class A conviction)
State v. Bousquet, 133 N.H. 485 (N.H. 1990) (upholding deemed waiver in two-tier appellate context)
State v. Foote, 149 N.H. 323 (N.H. 2003) (jury-trial right analysis for misdemeanors)
Preston v. Seay, 541 F. Supp. 898 (D. Mass. 1982) (upholding deemed waiver doctrine in Massachusetts two-tier system)
Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618 (U.S. 1976) (state regulation of modes for exercising jury right can be reasonable)
Stewart v. Bader, 154 N.H. 75 (N.H. 2006) (convictions remain valid until overturned)