State v. Thomas Campbell Kelley
161 Idaho 686
Idaho2017Background
- Thomas Kelley was convicted after pleading guilty to marijuana trafficking following denial of his suppression motion; he reserved appeal on that issue.
- The State sought restitution under Idaho Code § 37-2732(k) to recover prosecution/investigation costs; initial and revised unsworn billing statements were submitted at hearing.
- The district court found the State’s requested amount excessive, discounted the Hourly rate and hours, and awarded $2,640 (35.2 hours at $75/hr).
- Kelley appealed; the Idaho Court of Appeals vacated the award on evidentiary grounds (relying on the State’s unsworn statements) and remanded, but Kelley did not preserve that evidentiary argument before the Supreme Court.
- On review, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether § 37-2732(k) violates the Sixth Amendment (chilling right to trial) or the Fourteenth Amendment (equal protection re: indigent defendants), and whether the district court abused its discretion by not considering Kelley’s ability to pay.
- The Court affirmed the district court: held § 37-2732(k) constitutional and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding reduced restitution despite Kelley’s financial circumstances.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether § 37-2732(k) impermissibly chills Sixth Amendment right to stand trial and present a defense | Kelley: statute deters exercising trial rights because conviction can increase restitution costs | State: statute legitimately recoups prosecution costs and does not "needlessly" penalize trial rights; similar federal/state laws upheld | Court: statute does not impermissibly chill Sixth Amendment rights; distinguishes Jackson and relies on contrary precedent |
| Whether § 37-2732(k) violates Fourteenth Amendment equal protection by burdening indigent defendants | Kelley: imposing restitution regardless of ability to pay discriminates against indigent defendants | State: statute applies equally to all convicted defendants and draws no invidious classification | Court: no equal protection violation; statute treats all convicted persons equally |
| Whether district court abused discretion by failing to consider Kelley’s ability to pay when ordering restitution | Kelley: court did not discuss how his financial situation or incarceration affected amount | State: district court considered Idaho restitution factors (citing § 19-5304(7)) and reduced award as discretionary | Court: no abuse of discretion; court quoted § 19-5304(7), considered inability to pay, and reasonably reduced award |
Key Cases Cited
- United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (invalidated a statute that "needlessly penalize[d]" assertion of jury-trial rights)
- Chaffin v. Stynchcombe, 412 U.S. 17 (1973) (Jackson does not bar every state-imposed choice that may discourage exercising rights)
- James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972) (equal protection violation where debtors’ exemptions were stripped solely because of public defender reimbursements)
- Rinaldi v. Yeager, 384 U.S. 305 (1966) (equal protection violated where indigent, institutionalized appellants were singled out for transcript charges)
- United States v. Chavez, 627 F.2d 953 (9th Cir. 1980) (upheld federal statute requiring payment of prosecution costs against chilling-rights challenge)
- State v. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 361 P.3d 1280 (Ct. App. 2015) (affirmed denial of suppression motion)
- State v. Gomez, 153 Idaho 253, 281 P.3d 90 (2012) (general restitution statute may inform § 37-2732(k) awards)
- State v. Taie, 138 Idaho 878, 71 P.3d 477 (Ct. App. 2003) (inability to pay does not preclude restitution; ability to pay is one factor)
