State v. Thomas A. Gauthier, 238 A.3d 675

Defendant (Gauthier) was convicted in 2010 of sexual assault of a minor and became subject to Vermont’s Sex Offender Registration Act.
DOC notified him of registration duties; DOC reported his community release and addresses to the registry in 2014; he confirmed in 2015.
In 2016 the registry sent annual address-verification requests; Gauthier, while on furlough living in the community, failed to return the annual verification required within ten days after his birthday.
State charged him under 13 V.S.A. § 5409(b) for knowingly failing to comply with registry requirements for more than five days.
Gauthier moved to dismiss, arguing § 5407(e)’s exception “during periods of incarceration” covers furlough; trial court denied the motion; he entered a conditional no contest plea and appealed the statutory-interpretation question.

Issue	State's Argument	Gauthier's Argument	Held
Whether the § 5407(e) exception for compliance "during periods of incarceration" covers persons released on furlough living in the community	Reporting requirements apply to anyone residing in the community; "incarceration" means confinement in jail/prison, so furloughed persons are not excepted	Furlough is a form of incarceration or at least included within the statute’s meaning of "incarceration," so reporting exception applies	Court held "incarceration" means physical confinement (prison/jail); furloughed persons living in the community are not "incarcerated," so § 5407 reporting duties apply and conviction affirmed

State v. Amsden, 75 A.3d 612 (standard of review for statutory interpretation)
State v. Brunner, 99 A.3d 1019 (interpret statutes by plain, ordinary meaning)
State v. Therrien, 38 A.3d 1129 (apply statute when language is clear and unambiguous)
State v. Thompson, 807 A.2d 454 (purpose of Sex Offender Registration Act: furnish authorities info to prevent/investigate offenses)
Conway v. Cumming, 636 A.2d 735 (furlough context; factual distinction where individual remained incarcerated)
State v. Bogert, 109 A.3d 883 (described furlough as status closer to incarceration than parole but not identical)