State v. Thieszen
295 Neb. 293
| Neb. | 2016Background
- In 1987, Sydney L. Thieszen (age 14) murdered his 12-year-old sister; he ultimately was convicted of first-degree murder at trial and sentenced to life imprisonment plus a consecutive 80–240 month term for use of a firearm.
- Thieszen’s original plea-based conviction had been vacated in 1995 for omission of malice; after retrial he received life for first-degree murder in 1996.
- In June 2013 Thieszen filed a postconviction motion arguing his life sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment under Miller v. Alabama (holding mandatory life without parole for juvenile offenders unconstitutional).
- The district court granted postconviction relief, vacated Thieszen’s life sentence, and set a resentencing hearing. The State appealed.
- The Nebraska Supreme Court considered (1) whether the district court’s order was a final appealable order and (2) whether Miller and its retroactivity (as clarified in Montgomery v. Louisiana) required relief because Nebraska’s life sentence functioned as life without parole.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Thieszen's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court’s order vacating sentence is a final, appealable order | Order is not a final judgment or affects only collateral matters | Vacatur of sentence disposes of the postconviction proceeding and is final | Vacatur of sentence is a final order in a postconviction special proceeding — appealable |
| Whether Miller v. Alabama applies to Thieszen’s life sentence | Miller inapplicable because Thieszen’s life term was not mandatory and parole/commutation opportunities existed | Miller applies because Nebraska’s life sentence is effectively life without parole for juveniles | Miller governs; Nebraska’s sentencing scheme produced an effective life-without-parole sentence for first-degree murder juveniles |
| Whether Nebraska’s statutory options for juvenile disposition or parole/commutation avoid Miller’s rule | § 29-2204(2) and later programming/commutation options made the sentence discretionary/with hope of release | Statutory juvenile-disposition option was not available at resentencing; parole eligibility cannot be computed for life sentences, and commutation is discretionary and not a meaningful opportunity | § 29-2204(2) was inapplicable at resentencing; parole/commutation do not provide a meaningful opportunity for release — Miller applies |
| Whether Miller is retroactive on collateral review | State argued limitations on Miller’s retroactivity or scope | Thieszen relied on Montgomery’s holding that Miller is retroactive | Miller is retroactive on state collateral review per Montgomery; state courts are bound by U.S. Supreme Court precedent |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (mandatory life without parole for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (Miller’s rule is retroactive on state collateral review)
- State v. Castaneda, 287 Neb. 289 (Nebraska life sentence for first-degree murder is effectively life without parole; remote commutation/parole access insufficient under Miller)