State v. Theo Bosa, 176 A.3d 769

Background

Defendant Theo Bosa was arrested on January 8, 2016, on superior-court charges (second-degree assault and criminal trespass) and an outstanding warrant for protective-order violations, leading to parallel circuit-court charges for three misdemeanor protective-order violations.
Defendant remained in custody from January 8 through September 7, 2016 (243 days) because he did not post bail on either set of charges.
On June 27, 2016, the Circuit Court convicted the defendant on two misdemeanor protective-order counts and sentenced him to 12 months at the house of corrections with all but four months suspended; the court credited him with 120 days of presentence confinement (satisfying the four-month stand-committed portion).
In late July 2016, the defendant was convicted in Superior Court; on September 7, 2016, the Superior Court sentenced him to 3–7 years state prison (stand committed) on the assault and imposed other suspended sentences.
Parties agreed defendant had 243 days incarcerated pre-sentencing; defendant sought full 243 days credit on the superior-court sentence, while the State contended only 123 days were available because 120 days had already been credited by the circuit court.
Superior Court awarded 123 days credit (243 total minus 120 days previously credited by circuit court); defendant appealed.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Bosa)	Held
Whether superior court must credit defendant with all 243 days of presentence confinement despite circuit court credit	Only 123 days available because 120 days had already been credited by the circuit court and thus were "under a sentence of confinement" and excluded by statute	Superior court must credit full 243 days; the circuit and superior sentences are concurrent or, alternatively, court had discretion to grant full credit	Superior court correctly awarded 123 days: the 120 days previously credited were effectively time under a sentence of confinement and thus excluded from additional credit under RSA 651-A:23
Whether the two courts’ sentences were concurrent such that credit could be applied twice	N/A (State argues no double-counting)	Sentences are concurrent because not pronounced consecutive, so presentence time should be credited to both	Not concurrent: the circuit stand-committed portion was fully discharged by the 120 days of credit before superior sentencing, so no overlap existed to permit concurrency
Whether superior court had discretion to grant 243 days despite statutory exclusion	N/A	Even if not required, trial court could exercise discretion to award full 243 days	No: credit is mandatory but limited by statute to days not "under any sentence of confinement;" court lacked discretion to award days already used to satisfy another sentence
Proper interpretation of RSA 651:3 and RSA 651-A:23 regarding retrospective application of sentence credit	Statute excludes days that were under a sentence of confinement; retrospective satisfaction of the circuit sentence makes those days unavailable	Argues he was never "under a sentence of confinement" during the relevant period because sentencing occurred later and the circuit credit simply satisfied the sentence thereafter	Court holds that presentence credit applied by circuit court effectively made those days serve to satisfy a sentence (retrospectively), falling within the statute’s exclusion

Key Cases Cited

State v. Forest, 163 N.H. 616 (discussing presentence confinement credit statutory framework)
State v. Edson, 153 N.H. 45 (recognizing court discretion to allocate pretrial credit among sentences)
State v. Philbrick, 127 N.H. 353 (holding crediting rule is mandatory under the statute)
State v. Rau, 129 N.H. 126 (noting sentencing courts’ discretion to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences)
State v. Trudeau, 487 N.W.2d 11 (explaining that presentence time credited toward a sentence is effectively time served pursuant to that sentence)