State v. Thalken, 299 Neb. 857

Background

At ~1:15 a.m., Omaha officer Pat Soltys observed Matthew Thalken approach and pass his cruiser with exceptionally bright headlights and auxiliary (fog) lights illuminated and did not dim them; Soltys stopped Thalken and detected signs of alcohol impairment.
Thalken moved to suppress the traffic stop; the county court denied the motion, and Thalken was convicted of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence after a stipulated-facts bench trial.
On appeal to the district court (which sat as an intermediate appellate court), the district court reversed, concluding the officer stopped Thalken based on an incorrect belief that auxiliary lights were per se illegal and relied on State v. Au.
The State sought review by exception to the Nebraska Supreme Court under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2315.01; the Supreme Court granted the exception.
The Supreme Court examined whether, under an objective probable-cause standard, the officer had legal justification to stop Thalken based on violation of statutes requiring dimming when within 200 feet of another vehicle and prohibiting glaring/dazzling lights.
The Supreme Court also addressed the scope of relief available in State exception proceedings under § 29-2316 when the district court acted as an appellate court.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Thalken)	Held
Was the traffic stop supported by probable cause?	Facts (bright auxiliary lights within ~40 ft; failed to dim within 200 ft) established a violation of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 60-6,225(2) read with § 60-6,224(2), so probable cause existed.	Stop was based on officers mistaken belief that auxiliary lights were per se illegal; Au requires consideration of surrounding circumstances, so stop was unreasonable.	Probable cause existed objectively: statutory violation (failure to dim auxiliary lights when within 200 ft) justified the stop despite officers mistaken legal belief.
Does an officers mistaken understanding of the law negate probable cause?	Officers mistaken belief is irrelevant if the facts known to the officer objectively establish probable cause.	Mistake of law here made the stop improper; Au supports reversal where statutory application required factual/contextual analysis.	Mistake of law does not defeat probable cause; focus is on objective facts known to the officer, not officers legal reasoning.
May the Nebraska Supreme Court reinstate a county-court conviction on State exception from the district court sitting as appellate court, or does § 29-2316 bar such relief when "placed legally in jeopardy"?	§ 29-2316 does not preclude relief here because the defendant was placed in jeopardy in the county court, not in the district court sitting as an appellate court; thus the Supreme Court may reverse the district court and reinstate the conviction.	§ 29-2316s "not be reversed nor in any manner affected when the defendant . . . has been placed legally in jeopardy" (and prior precedent) could limit relief the Supreme Court can provide in State exception proceedings.	The Court held "placed legally in jeopardy" refers to where jeopardy attached (trial court), and when the district court merely acted as an appellate court, § 29-2316 does not limit the Supreme Courts ability to reverse the district court and reinstate the conviction.
How should precedents equating "placed legally in jeopardy" with constitutional double jeopardy be treated?	The State urged alignment with double jeopardy principles for jurisdictional effect.	Thalken relied on past cases treating the phrase expansively.	The Court clarified that "placed legally in jeopardy" is not synonymous with constitutional double jeopardy and overruled prior dispositional language to the extent it conflated the concepts.

Key Cases Cited

State v. Au, 285 Neb. 797 (discussed limits of probabilistic statutory violations and need to consider surrounding circumstances)
State v. Magallanes, 284 Neb. 871 (objective statutory violation can supply probable cause)
State v. Schall, 234 Neb. 101 (historical discussion of State exception proceedings and jurisdictional path)
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (traffic stops and Fourth Amendment seizure principles)
United States v. Sisson, 399 U.S. 267 (government appeal limits and "placed in jeopardy" discussion)