894 S.E.2d 820
S.C. Ct. App.2023Background
- In 2003, Terriel Leshawn Mack (17 at the time) was convicted of murder and originally sentenced to life without parole (LWOP); co-defendants testified Mack shot the victim and the State relied on an incriminating jail letter.
- Under Aiken v. Byars (applying Miller v. Alabama), Mack was entitled to a resentencing hearing so the court could consider juvenile-specific mitigating factors (the "Aiken factors").
- At resentencing the court again imposed LWOP, citing the cold-blooded nature of the killing and Mack's prison disciplinary record; the court stated it had considered Aiken but treated Mack's age mostly as a chronological fact and faulted him for not overcoming a traumatic upbringing.
- Defense presented mitigation evidence: forensic and psychiatric evaluations describing childhood abuse, sexual assault, early substance use, dysfunctional family relationships, juvenile records, and expert opinion that Mack could be rehabilitated.
- The Court of Appeals held the resentencing order failed to meaningfully consider (1) the hallmark features of youth (immaturity, impetuosity, failure to appreciate risks), and (2) how Mack's family/home environment affected him, and therefore reversed and remanded for a faithful Aiken-factor analysis.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Mack) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether resentencing required an explicit finding of "irreparable corruption"/permanent incorrigibility | Jones does not change Miller/Aiken's requirement to protect juveniles; court should require such a finding | Jones v. Mississippi eliminates any obligation to make a separate permanent-incorrigibility finding | Rejected — post-Jones, a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility is not required (Jones controls) |
| Whether the court adequately considered the hallmark features of youth (immaturity, impetuosity, etc.) | The court treated age as a mere chronological fact and failed to analyze how hallmark features affected culpability | Court purported to consider Aiken factors and emphasized proximity to adulthood as relevant | Reversed — court failed to meaningfully consider hallmark features of youth; must do so on remand |
| Whether the court adequately considered the family/home environment Aiken factor | The court dismissed mitigation by pointing to others who overcame hardship instead of analyzing how Mack's upbringing affected him | Court argued Mack grew up in a bad home but referenced examples of people who overcame trauma to justify LWOP | Reversed — court did not make individualized findings about how Mack's family/home environment influenced him; must reassess |
| Whether the court erred rejecting rehabilitation potential tied to Mack's youth | Defense proffered expert opinion and records supporting possibility of rehabilitation given juvenile status | State emphasized prison misconduct and seriousness of offense to argue lack of rehabilitation | Reversed in part — court did not properly weigh rehabilitation potential in light of Aiken/Miller; requires reconsideration |
Key Cases Cited
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates the Eighth Amendment; sentencer must account for youth's characteristics)
- Montgomery v. Louisiana, 577 U.S. 190 (2016) (Miller requires individualized consideration to separate transient immaturity from permanent incorrigibility)
- Jones v. Mississippi, 141 S. Ct. 1307 (2021) (Miller does not require a separate factual finding of permanent incorrigibility before imposing LWOP)
- Aiken v. Byars, 410 S.C. 534, 765 S.E.2d 572 (2014) (South Carolina plurality adopting Aiken factors to guide juvenile LWOP resentencing)
- State v. Smart, 439 S.C. 641, 889 S.E.2d 573 (2023) (state-level resentencing must consider Aiken factors; neither party bears burden to prove mitigation)
- State v. Roby, 897 N.W.2d 127 (Iowa 2017) (interpreting family/home Aiken-type factor: assess specific impact of family circumstances using expert evidence)