State v. Teresa Lee Tollman, 162 Idaho 798

In 2012 Tollman pled guilty to felony DUI; in 2013 the district court sentenced her to a unified 10-year term and ordered her driver’s license absolutely suspended for five years beginning at release.
In 2015 the Idaho Legislature amended I.C. § 18-8005(6)(d) to allow defendants, after a one-year mandatory no-driving period following release, to request restricted driving privileges during an additional up-to-four-year suspension period if they prove necessity by a preponderance of the evidence.
Tollman first applied for restricted driving privileges on March 14, 2016; the district court denied the motion, concluding it lacked authority because Tollman’s 2013 sentence imposed an absolute five-year suspension under the law in effect at sentencing.
Tollman reapplied in September 2016 with proof her one-year no-driving period had elapsed and evidence of sobriety, employment needs, and family needs; the district court held a hearing and again denied relief, explaining the 2015 amendment could not be applied to a sentence that was final in 2013.
Tollman appealed, arguing the 2015 amendment should govern because she filed her application after its enactment and that the amendment is remedial/procedural rather than retroactive.
The Idaho Supreme Court affirmed, holding the amendment did not apply to Tollman because her sentence was final before the amendment and there was no express legislative intent to make the amendment retroactive.

Issue	Tollman’s Argument	State’s Argument	Held
Whether the district court had discretion to grant restricted driving privileges under the 2015 amendment	The amendment should apply because Tollman sought relief after it took effect; the change is procedural/remedial and thus not retroactive	The sentence was final in 2013; statutes reducing penalties apply only when sentence is not final or Legislature expressly makes amendment retroactive	The court held the district court lacked discretion to grant relief under the amendment because Tollman’s sentence was final before the amendment and no retroactivity was expressed

State v. Schulz, 264 P.3d 970 (Idaho 2011) (statutory interpretation principles)
State v. Leary, 372 P.3d 404 (Idaho 2016) (statutory amendments not retroactive absent express intent)
Bryant v. City of Blackfoot, 48 P.3d 636 (Idaho 2002) (statutory changes are not retroactive merely because they refer to antecedent facts; procedural laws may apply to existing causes of action)
State v. Morris, 954 P.2d 681 (Idaho Ct. App. 1998) (ameliorative sentencing statutes apply when sentence is not final at time amendment becomes effective)
In re Estrada, 408 P.2d 948 (Cal. 1965) (ameliorative statutes reducing punishment apply to cases decided after enactment)
State v. Tapp, 490 P.2d 334 (Utah 1971) (lesser penalty applies only if amendment effective before judgment and sentence)
People v. Oliver, 134 N.E.2d 197 (N.Y. 1956) (lesser penalty may be imposed in cases decided after effective date of ameliorative statute)