State v. Tench
123 N.E.3d 955
| Ohio | 2018Background
- James Tench was convicted by a jury of aggravated murder (and related counts) for the 2013 beating death of his mother, Mary Tench; jury recommended death and the trial court imposed the death sentence.
- Physical and forensic evidence: victim suffered multiple blunt-force injuries; victim's DNA/blood found on Tench's boots and on Tench's SUV; footprints led from the vehicle to the Tench neighborhood; duct tape around victim's neck consistent with tape Tench purchased; computer and cell‑phone records placed relevant phones in proximate locations and showed Google Maps imagery of the field where the body was found.
- Other evidentiary background: Tench had a motive asserted by the State—preventing his mother from reporting his thefts (forged checks, unauthorized use of her cards); Tench had previously committed an armed robbery of an Old Carolina Barbecue and had purchased duct tape/tarpaulin days before the murder.
- Procedural posture: Tench raised 18 propositions on appeal challenging suppression rulings, admission of other‑acts evidence, Confrontation Clause, jury selection, attorney‑client privilege, prosecutorial misconduct, sentencing procedures, and effectiveness of counsel. Ohio Supreme Court affirmed convictions and death sentence in large part but vacated aggravated‑robbery findings and related death specifications.
- Court’s dispositive rulings included: admission of many contested items (with some errors), denial of suppression claims (Miranda/Edwards and Sixth Amendment contentions rejected), finding Confrontation‑Clause error as non‑plain, harmless error determinations, and reversal of aggravated‑robbery death specification for insufficient proof of "deprive."
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Tench) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Suppression—Miranda/Edwards (Nov.12 statements) | Police lawfully continued non‑custodial and custodial questioning; Tench either did not unambiguously invoke counsel or he reopened dialogue, so statements admissible | Tench invoked right to counsel; post‑invocation questioning violated Edwards; statements should be suppressed | Court held Tench initially made an ambiguous remark but later unambiguously asked for counsel; nevertheless, after each invocation Tench himself initiated substantive discussion, so statements were admissible and waiver was valid |
| Sixth Amendment (Nov.13 Strongsville interview re: robbery) | No Sixth Amendment violation because adversarial proceedings had not attached for the murder charges; Miranda waiver was valid | Interrogation occurred while represented or after charging, violating Sixth Amendment | Held no Sixth Amendment violation—no adversarial proceedings had attached for these charges |
| Admission of other‑acts (esp. Old Carolina Barbecue robbery) | Robbery evidence relevant to motive and to explaining police focus on Tench | Robbery evidence was propensity evidence, irrelevant or unduly prejudicial under Evid.R.404(B) | Court found admission of robbery evidence was an abuse of discretion (improper other‑acts use), but errors deemed harmless given overwhelming properly admitted guilt evidence; robbery‑based death specification later vacated |
| Confrontation Clause—latent‑print testimony (testimony relaying retired examiner’s findings) | Testimony was permissible laboratory testimony; not prejudicial | Testimony introduced nontestifying examiner’s testimonial statements, violating Crawford and Bullcoming | Court agreed Limpert’s (nontestifying examiner) findings were testimonial but defendant did not object; Confrontation error was not plain because admitted material (no useful inculpatory fingerprint) caused no prejudice |
| Sufficiency of aggravated‑robbery death specification | Disposal of victim’s purse amounted to a theft offense (deprive) supporting aggravated‑robbery specification | Evidence does not prove deprivation or purpose to permanently deprive; taking/disposal inconsistent with statutory definition | Court reversed aggravated‑robbery conviction/specification: insufficient evidence to prove the statutory "deprive" element |
| Ineffective assistance / voir dire (failure to rehabilitate capital‑scrupled jurors) | N/A (State opposed) | Counsel ineffective for not rehabilitating jurors excused for cause, prejudicing penalty outcome | Court rejected ineffective‑assistance claims: counsel’s performance not deficient or prejudice not shown; juror exclusions upheld |
Key Cases Cited
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (U.S. 1966) (Miranda custodial‑interrogation warnings and right to counsel rule)
- Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (U.S. 1981) (post‑invocation interrogation forbidden unless suspect initiates further discussion)
- Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452 (U.S. 1994) (invocation of counsel must be unambiguous)
- Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039 (U.S. 1983) (clarifies what constitutes a suspect‑initiated consultation after invocation)
- Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (U.S. 2010) (valid waiver of Miranda need not be express; silence and conduct may show waiver)
- North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (U.S. 1979) (waiver of Miranda rights may be inferred from defendant’s course of conduct)
- Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (U.S. 2004) (testimonial statements of absent witnesses implicate Confrontation Clause)
- Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (U.S. 2011) (lab reports and testimonial forensic results require opportunity for confrontation)
- Williams v. Illinois, 567 U.S. 50 (U.S. 2012) (plurality analysis on when forensic reports are testimonial)