173 So. 3d 1129
Fla. Dist. Ct. App.2015Background
- Templar-O'Brien was charged in July 2013 with multiple stalking-related and related offenses; trial originally set for October 2013.
- On October 7, 2013, he moved for a continuance and specifically executed a written waiver of his speedy-trial rights.
- A mistrial occurred on December 17, 2013 at the defendant's request; defendant thereafter filed a pro se "notice of expiration of speedy trial" on December 31, 2013 while still represented by counsel.
- The State nol-prossed and refiled the same information on January 13, 2014. Defendant later sought to represent himself; successive filings in March 2014 sought discharge under Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.191.
- A successor judge granted discharge on April 3, 2014, ruling that speedy-trial time had expired; the State appealed.
Issues
| Issue | State's Argument | Templar-O'Brien's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the October 7 written waiver of speedy trial remained effective after the mistrial and tolled relief under rule 3.191(m)/(p) | Waiver was valid and continued through retrial after mistrial; thus defendant not entitled to relief when 90 days elapsed | Waiver did not prevent him from obtaining discharge after the mistrial and elapsed 90-day period | Court held waiver remained effective after mistrial; defendant not entitled to relief under (m)/(p) because he had waived speedy trial |
| Whether the State's nol pros and immediate refiling on Jan 13, 2014 revived speedy-trial rights or defeated the prior waiver | The waiver carried over to the refiled information; nol pros did not restart speedy-trial protections where defendant had waived | Defendant argued the refiled information and later filings restarted the clock | Court held waiver carried over to refiled information; nol pros did not negate previous waiver |
| Whether the December 31 pro se notice (filed while represented) or the March 18 notice operated as a proper demand for speedy trial under rule 3.191(b) | The December 31 pro se filing was a nullity while counsel represented defendant; defendant never filed a valid demand under rule 3.191(b) (and even the March 18 filing would have given the State more time) | Defendant contended the filings should be treated as demands, starting the shorter timeframes and entitling him to discharge | Court held pro se December 31 filing was a nullity; defendant never filed a valid demand for speedy trial, and even treating the March 18 filing as a demand would have given the State 45 days (not yet expired when discharge was granted) |
Key Cases Cited
- State v. Ryder, 449 So. 2d 398 (Fla. 2d DCA) (pretrial waiver of speedy trial applies through retrial after mistrial)
- Koshel v. State, 689 So. 2d 1229 (Fla. 5th DCA) (written waiver of speedy trial waives all provisions of the speedy-trial rule unless limited)
- State ex rel. Gibson v. Olliff, 452 So. 2d 110 (Fla. 1st DCA) (same principle regarding waiver carrying through)
- State v. Condon, 444 So. 2d 73 (Fla. 4th DCA) (waiver by continuance carries over to a refiled information)
- Stewart v. State, 491 So. 2d 271 (Fla.) (holding state did not violate speedy-trial rule when defendant had waived rights and information was nol prossed)
- State v. Burgess, 153 So. 3d 286 (Fla. 2d DCA) (defendant may restart speedy-trial clock by filing a demand under rule 3.191(b))
- State v. Craven, 955 So. 2d 1182 (Fla. 4th DCA) (pro se demand while represented by counsel is a nullity)
- Harden v. State, 152 So. 3d 626 (Fla. 3d DCA) (same: pro se demand not adopted by counsel cannot be entertained)