State v. Tellegen, 314 P.3d 902

On Jan. 13, 2012 Tellegen and three others went to a house; co‑defendants entered and took items; Tellegen drove the car into the garage and was alleged to have helped load items.
State initially charged Tellegen with accountability for burglary, then amended to burglary, conspiracy to commit burglary, and theft (with accountability charge withdrawn).
At trial the court gave an accountability instruction for burglary over Tellegen’s objection; the court adopted a conduct‑based definition of the mental state “purposely” (defense did not object).
Jury convicted Tellegen of burglary (accountability theory) and theft (theft was treated as the predicate offense).
Tellegen appealed: (1) instruction on accountability when not charged as a separate offense; (2) ineffective assistance for counsel’s proposed definition of “purposely;” (3) ineffective assistance for failing to object that convicting on theft and burglary violated Montana’s multiple‑charges prohibition.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether court erred by instructing on accountability though State had withdrawn an accountability charge	State: accountability is a theory of liability, not a separate charge; no new notice required	Tellegen: she lacked notice that State would pursue accountability theory	Court: No error — accountability is not a separate offense; Tower controls; Tellegen had notice
Whether counsel was ineffective for offering a conduct‑based definition of “purposely”	State: no prejudice because evidence supported guilt under either conduct‑ or result‑based standard	Tellegen: instruction misstated law and prejudiced her defense	Court: No prejudice under Strickland; a reasonable jury could convict under either standard
Whether counsel was ineffective for failing to object that theft conviction violated the statutory ban on multiple charges when theft was a predicate to burglary	State: choice of charging language controls; trial proceeded on burglary defined with predicate offense	Tellegen: charging and conviction of both theft and burglary (with theft as predicate) violates § 46‑11‑410(2)(a)	Court: Counsel performed deficiently and prejudice occurred; theft conviction vacated and remanded for recalculation of fees/costs

State v. Tower, 267 Mont. 63, 881 P.2d 1317 (Mont. 1994) (accountability is a theory of liability, not a separate offense)
State v. Maetche, 343 Mont. 464, 185 P.3d 980 (Mont. 2008) (reaffirming accountability as non‑separate offense)
In re B.D.C., 211 Mont. 216, 687 P.2d 655 (Mont. 1984) (same principle on accountability)
State v. Medrano, 285 Mont. 69, 945 P.2d 937 (Mont. 1997) (notice of accountability theory where defendants acted in concert)
State v. Spotted Eagle, 358 Mont. 22, 243 P.3d 402 (Mont. 2010) (distinguishing a substantive element change from an accountability theory)
State v. Russell, 347 Mont. 301, 198 P.3d 271 (Mont. 2008) (predicate offense included in greater offense creates multiple‑charge issue where State framed charges that way)
State v. Becker, 326 Mont. 364, 110 P.3d 1 (Mont. 2005) (failure to make valid objection can be deficient performance)
State v. Williams, 355 Mont. 354, 228 P.3d 1127 (Mont. 2010) (vacated convictions affect fees and punishments even if sentences run concurrently)
Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856 (U.S. 1985) (second conviction’s legal consequences persist even if sentences concurrent)