State v. Tegano
1411017324
| Del. Super. Ct. | Nov 15, 2017Background
- Tegano pled guilty (Feb 24, 2015) to one count of second-degree rape (11 Del. C. § 772) after the State nolle prossed several additional sexual-offense charges in exchange for the plea. Parties recommended 25 years at Level V, suspended after 10 years (minimum mandatory); the court accepted that sentence.
- Facts: a 14-year-old runaway (Winslow) met Tegano online; police found him with Tegano on Nov 28, 2014; Winslow reported oral and vaginal sex with Tegano; Tegano admitted sexual activity but said she believed he was 19. Tegano was arrested Nov 29, 2014.
- Tegano filed a pro se Rule 61 motion for postconviction relief alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, sentencing disparity, and improper treatment as a habitual offender (despite no prior record).
- Procedural posture: first Rule 61 motion, filed within one year of conviction becoming final; only the ineffective-assistance claim could avoid Rule 61(i)(3) procedural bar because it alleges cause; other claims were procedurally barred and factually incorrect.
- Commissioner conducted de novo review and recommended denial: counsel’s performance was within Strickland reasonableness, plea was knowing and voluntary based on colloquy and signed plea form, and Tegano failed to show prejudice or concrete allegations supporting relief.
- The Superior Court adopted the Commissioner’s Report in full and denied Tegano’s Rule 61 motion (Order dated Nov 15, 2017).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Ineffective assistance of counsel (failure to obtain lesser plea) | Deely pressured Tegano into a harsher plea despite it being her first offense; she would have accepted lesser 3rd-degree rape plea (6 years) | Counsel negotiated a plea that avoided exposure to a 30-year minimum; counsel discussed options; plea was advantageous | Denied — counsel's performance was reasonable under Strickland and Tegano failed to show prejudice or that she would have insisted on trial |
| Voluntariness/knowing plea | Plea was not voluntary/coerced | The plea colloquy and signed plea form show Tegano understood rights and consequences and stated satisfaction with counsel | Denied — record shows plea was knowing and voluntary |
| Procedural default of other claims (sentencing disparity, habitual-offender allegation) | Sentencing was disproportionate compared to other cases; claimed mischaracterization as habitual | Claims were not raised earlier and Tegano gave no cause; record shows she received the statutorily required minimum and was not deemed habitual | Denied/Barred — claims procedurally defaulted and meritless on the record |
| Sentencing disparity/habitual offender claim | Cited other defendants with lesser sentences; asserted wrongful characterization as habitual | Sentence reflected plea agreement and statutory minimum; no habitual-offender finding in record | Denied — factual record contradicts Tegano’s assertions |
Key Cases Cited
- Bailey v. State, 588 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1991) (procedural bars under Rule 61 explained)
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective-assistance test)
- Somerville v. State, 703 A.2d 629 (Del. 1997) (requirements for proving prejudice and plea challenges)
- Albury v. State, 551 A.2d 53 (Del. 1988) (deference to counsel’s performance and standards for review)
- Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990) (highly demanding standard for ineffective-assistance review)
- Outten v. State, 720 A.2d 547 (Del. 1998) (necessity of concrete allegations of prejudice)
- Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365 (1986) (context on reviewing counsel performance in criminal proceedings)
- Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389 (1993) (standards for determining knowing and voluntary pleas)