State v. Taylor (Slip Opinion), 163 N.E.3d 486

Background

Darren Taylor was convicted of two murders related to an attempted pawn-shop robbery and sentenced to 36 years to life; the trial court also ordered restitution and mandatory court costs.
Taylor later moved to vacate or suspend restitution and court costs on the ground of indigency (reported prison wages ~$19/month); the trial court denied his motion and denied reconsideration.
The Second District affirmed as to restitution but, relying on its precedent, reversed regarding court costs, holding the trial court abused its discretion by failing to consider Taylor’s indigency and ability to pay and remanded for reconsideration.
The State appealed to the Ohio Supreme Court to resolve whether R.C. 2947.23(C) requires trial courts to consider a defendant’s present or future ability to pay when ruling on motions to waive, suspend, or modify court costs.
The Ohio Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, holding the statute does not obligate trial courts to consider ability to pay (though courts may do so); the case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with that ruling.

Issues

Issue	State's Argument	Taylor's Argument	Held
Whether R.C. 2947.23(C) requires a trial court to consider a defendant’s present or future ability to pay before granting/denying a motion to waive, suspend, or modify court costs	R.C. 2947.23(A) mandates imposition of court costs and subsection (C) grants discretionary authority to waive/suspend/modify but contains no textual requirement to consider ability to pay; courts may consider it but are not required to	The statutory structure and options (waive, suspend, modify) implicitly require an ability-to-pay inquiry; absent that requirement collection may be pointless or unjust	No. The statute imposes no mandatory requirement to consider ability to pay; trial courts may consider it but are not legally required to do so when ruling under R.C. 2947.23(C).
Whether the statute is constitutionally infirm absent an ability-to-pay requirement because it could chill constitutional rights (e.g., jury trial, compulsory process)	The statutory scheme is civil in nature, does not permit imprisonment for nonpayment, and contains safeguards (exemption statutes, community-service alternative); Fuller does not compel adding an ability-to-pay requirement here	Without an ability-to-pay requirement, indigent defendants might forgo substantive constitutional rights or be unfairly burdened; Fuller supports a requirement to avoid constitutional problems	No. The court held there is no constitutional defect that requires grafting an ability-to-pay requirement onto R.C. 2947.23(C); distinctions from Fuller (probation vs. civil debt) and existing protections undermine the constitutional argument.

Key Cases Cited

State v. White, 103 Ohio St.3d 580 (2004) (holds statute requires courts to impose costs against convicted defendants)
Fuller v. Oregon, 417 U.S. 40 (1974) (upheld costs-recoupment statute but noted exemption where repayment would cause manifest hardship)
Lamie v. United States Trustee, 540 U.S. 526 (2004) (cautions against reading implied statutory conditions not supported by text)
State ex rel. Russo v. McDonnell, 110 Ohio St.3d 144 (2006) (directs courts to construe statutes as written)
State v. Threatt, 108 Ohio St.3d 277 (2006) (notes purpose of court-costs statutes is to relieve taxpayers of the full burden of financing criminal proceedings)
State v. Black, 142 Ohio St.3d 332 (2015) (addresses statutory purpose in construction)
Strattman v. Studt, 20 Ohio St.2d 95 (1969) (recognizes court costs as civil and that imprisonment for civil debt is barred)