State v. Taylor
300 Neb. 629
| Neb. | 2018Background
- Taylor was convicted of first-degree murder and use of a deadly weapon; after a direct-appeal remand and retrial he was resentenced to 40–40 years for murder (he was a juvenile at the time of the offense).
- Taylor filed a pro se postconviction motion alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel in three respects: (1) failure to preserve/suppress evidence from an alleged unconstitutional stop/arrest; (2) failure to timely object to hearsay about the general location where a gun was found; and (3) failure to object to several alleged prosecutorial improprieties in closing argument.
- At trial officers observed a man matching a broadcast description near a car; the man ran, discarded a brown shirt later identified by a witness, was chased and arrested, and the shirt and other evidence were admitted.
- On direct appeal (Taylor I and Taylor II) some issues were previously litigated: a Miranda statement and coerced DNA were suppressed pretrial; the trial court denied suppression of the stop/arrest; admission of testimony identifying the precise location of the gun was held harmless error on direct appeal.
- The district court denied postconviction relief without an evidentiary hearing and refused to appoint counsel; Taylor appealed. The Nebraska Supreme Court affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1) Suppression of evidence from detention/arrest | Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object/preserve suppression of evidence obtained after an unconstitutional stop and arrest. | Trial court correctly ruled stop/arrest constitutional; suppression motion would have failed on appeal, so no prejudice. | Held: No ineffective assistance; stop/arrest lawful, no prejudice. |
| 2) Hearsay re: location of gun | Counsel was ineffective for not objecting earlier to Copeland’s testimony about the general location where the gun was found. | Copeland’s general-location testimony was cumulative and other independent evidence supported the verdict; no reasonable probability of a different result. | Held: No ineffective assistance; admission did not undermine confidence in verdict. |
| 3) Prosecutor’s closing arguments | Counsel was ineffective for not objecting/moving for mistrial based on five alleged improprieties (personal belief, misstating ID, asserting defendant held gun while running, vouching, Golden Rule-type argument). | Prosecutor drew reasonable inferences; comments did not mislead or unduly influence jury and were not vouching or Golden Rule misconduct. | Held: No prosecutorial misconduct; counsel not ineffective for failing to object. |
| 4) Appointment of postconviction counsel | Court erred in denying appointment of counsel for indigent defendant. | Appointment is discretionary; where claims are without merit, denial is not an abuse of discretion. | Held: Denial of appointed counsel was not an abuse of discretion. |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (establishing deficient-performance and prejudice test for ineffective assistance)
- Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (Miranda warnings and suppression of statements taken in custodial interrogation)
- State v. Taylor, 282 Neb. 297 (Taylor I) (direct-appeal decision addressing pretrial rulings)
- State v. Taylor, 287 Neb. 386 (Taylor II) (direct-appeal decision addressing hearsay/location and other issues)
- State v. Vela, 297 Neb. 227 (postconviction standards requiring factual allegations that, if proven, show constitutional infringement)
- State v. Botts, 299 Neb. 806 (two-part review of suppression rulings: factual findings for clear error, constitutional application de novo)
