State v. Taylor
1008008293
| Del. Super. Ct. | Oct 23, 2017Background
- Marc Taylor was convicted after a 24-day gang-participation trial (March 16, 2012) of multiple offenses, including Gang Participation, possession with intent to deliver a Schedule II controlled substance, firearms offenses, and second-degree assault; sentenced to 15.5 years imprisonment (May 23, 2012).
- Taylor appealed; the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed his convictions on September 25, 2013 (challenging gang statute vagueness, evidentiary rulings, and severance denial).
- Taylor filed a first Rule 61 postconviction motion (pro se, Nov. 13, 2013); counsel was appointed, reviewed the record, moved to withdraw, and the Superior Court denied relief on Dec. 17, 2015; the Delaware Supreme Court affirmed on Oct. 10, 2016.
- Taylor filed a second Rule 61 motion (July 19, 2017) raising three claims: (1) ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict (trial counsel had represented a state witness); (2) suppression of favorable/sealed docket evidence; and (3) failure to subpoena/exclude expert witnesses (gang expert and a firearms expert with differing results).
- The Superior Court treated this as a successive Rule 61 motion and summarily dismissed it as procedurally barred under Rule 61(i)(2) for repetitiveness, finding Taylor did not plead particularized new evidence of actual innocence nor a new retroactive constitutional rule, and his allegations were conclusory.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Taylor) | Defendant's Argument (State) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Conflict of interest / ineffective assistance of counsel | Trial counsel had a conflict because he previously represented a state witness who testified against Taylor. | Motion is successive and conclusory; no particularized new evidence or showing that the claim meets Rule 61(i) exceptions. | Dismissed as repetitive and procedurally barred; claim lacks required particularity. |
| Suppression of favorable evidence | A sealed docket item not presented at trial was favorable and its suppression violated due process; Taylor alleges it could prove innocence. | No particularized allegation identifying the item or how it creates a strong inference of actual innocence; successive motion barred. | Dismissed as repetitive and conclusory; failing to plead particularized new evidence. |
| Failure to subpoena / expert testimony (gang expert, firearms expert) | If the gang expert had testified, jury would better understand gang evidence; an uncalled firearms expert (Arthur Young) could explain discrepant test results raising chain-of-custody concerns. | These contentions were raised without particularized new evidence and are conclusory; successive-motion procedural bars apply. | Dismissed as repetitive and procedurally barred; no particularized factual showing. |
| Procedural bar for successive Rule 61 motions | Taylor argues merits of claims and seeks relief via second motion. | Rule 61(i)(2) bars repetitive motions unless movant pleads particularized new evidence of actual innocence or a new retroactive constitutional rule. | Court summarily dismissed the entire second Rule 61 motion as repetitive under Rule 61(i)(2); no exception was satisfied. |
Key Cases Cited
- Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d 791 (Del. 2013) (Supreme Court affirmed convictions on direct appeal)
- Taylor v. State, 149 A.3d 241 (Del. 2016) (Supreme Court affirmed denial of first Rule 61 postconviction motion)
- State v. Reyes, 155 A.3d 331 (Del. 2017) (Rule 61 analysis should proceed claim-by-claim)
- Bradley v. State, 135 A.3d 748 (Del. 2016) (discussing Rule 61 procedural requirements and need to resolve procedural bars before substantive review)