State v. Taylor, 114779

Background

On Dec. 26, 2014, Taylor was arrested after a single-car accident; police found marijuana and two loaded handguns in the rental car he was driving; one handgun (a Smith & Wesson) was later identified as stolen. Taylor denied knowledge of the guns in the car.
DNA testing showed Taylor's DNA on the trigger and DNA from four others; a forensic witness acknowledged transfer-DNA possibilities. Marijuana (5.21 g) was found in a shoe at booking.
Taylor was charged with theft (unauthorized control of the firearm with intent to permanently deprive), trafficking in contraband (introducing marijuana into the county jail), possession of marijuana, and driving with a suspended license. Jury convicted on all counts; sentence imposed with consecutive felonies.
At trial the prosecutor argued (incorrectly, per the appellate court) that possession of a stolen firearm is theft regardless of knowledge the firearm was stolen; the trial court denied a motion for acquittal and gave a trafficking instruction allowing conviction on intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly (though charged only with intentionally).
There was no evidence Taylor received individualized notice of the jail’s contraband rules; booking signs were inconsistent and contained no clear warning that bringing marijuana into the facility could trigger criminal trafficking charges.
The appellate court reversed both the theft and trafficking convictions: prosecutor misstated theft law and evidence was insufficient on intent for theft; trafficking conviction reversed because Watson requires individualized notice and none was provided.

Issues

Issue	Taylor's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Prosecutor's closing misstated law on theft of firearm (culpable mental state)	Prosecutor told jury knowledge that the firearm was stolen was not required; this lowered the State's burden	The statute's elements for obtaining unauthorized control don't expressly require knowledge the property was stolen; prosecutor responded to defense argument	Misstatement was legal error; theft statute requires intent to permanently deprive; prosecutor's comments were prejudicial and conviction reversed
Sufficiency of evidence for theft (intent to permanently deprive / knowledge firearm was stolen)	Evidence did not prove Taylor knew firearm was stolen; possession in rental car + DNA insufficient, and theft occurred 14–20 months earlier (not recent)	Circumstantial evidence supported guilt: gun was in Taylor's car, his DNA on trigger, refusal to give DNA, denials of knowledge	Insufficient evidence to prove requisite intent/knowledge under Atkinson/Bamberger line; conviction reversed and retrial barred
Notice requirement for trafficking-in-contraband (constitutional as applied / sufficiency / jury instruction / prosecutor comment)	Watson requires individualized notice from facility administrators of what items are contraband; Taylor received no such notice re: marijuana; statute as applied unconstitutional and evidence insufficient	State argued notice unnecessary—marijuana is per se contraband and penalty statutes give notice; trial court relied on precedent that notice only required for "intrinsically innocent" items	Watson controls: administrators must provide individualized notice; no notice here → statute applied unconstitutionally to Taylor, insufficient evidence, instructional and prosecutor errors required reversal
Jury instruction broadening culpable mental state for trafficking	Trial court instructed that jury could convict if act was intentional, knowing, or reckless though charge alleged only intentional conduct	State did not defend the instructional choice on appeal	Instructional error lowered mens rea, prejudiced Taylor; combined with lack of notice supports reversal (court did not reach further because it reversed on notice grounds)

Key Cases Cited

State v. Watson, 273 Kan. 426 (2002) (delegation to administrators is constitutional only if administrators give adequate individualized notice of what constitutes contraband)
State v. Sherman, 305 Kan. 88 (2016) (two-step prosecutorial-error analysis: error then prejudice under Chapman)
State v. Phillips, 299 Kan. 479 (2014) (prosecutorial misstatements of law fall outside permissible advocacy)
State v. Atkinson, 215 Kan. 139 (1974) (possession of recently stolen property plus unsatisfactory explanation can support theft inference)
State v. Bamberger, 210 Kan. 508 (1972) (possession of stolen property 14 months after theft is too remote to support presumption of guilt)
United States v. Park, 521 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1975) (statute delegating contraband definition upheld as-applied where visitor had received repeated notice)
People v. Holmes, 959 P.2d 406 (Colo. 1998) (facility administrators must provide nondeceptive notice that certain items will be treated as contraband and punishable)
People v. Carillo, 751 N.E.2d 1243 (Ill. App. 2001) (interpretations requiring notice to avoid punishing possession of "intrinsically innocent" items)