State v. Taylor, 501 P.3d 7

Defendant sat next to J at a community college library carrel, gradually encroached on her space, and reached under the desk to touch J’s vagina; J reported the incident and the State charged defendant with third-degree sexual abuse.
Security-camera footage from an earlier encounter the same day (on a different floor) showed defendant choosing a seat next to another lone woman and "man-spreading" his legs into her space; that upstairs encounter did not show contact and defendant was later acquitted of charges arising from it after a bench trial.
The State sought to play the upstairs video at J’s jury trial as other-acts evidence under OEC 404(3), arguing it was probative of defendant’s plan, motive, and absence of mistake rather than merely propensity.
Defense moved to exclude the video as impermissible propensity evidence and argued it would confuse the jury and was irrelevant to charges tried to the jury; defense also noted the State could not identify the upstairs woman as a witness.
The trial court admitted the video as relevant non-propensity evidence (plan, motive, preparation, absence of mistake); the jury convicted defendant of third-degree sexual abuse (ORS 163.415).
On appeal, defendant challenged admission of the video under OEC 401/404(3); the Court of Appeals affirmed, concluding the video was admissible as spurious-plan evidence probative of plan and related mental state.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Admissibility of upstairs security video as other-acts evidence under OEC 404(3)	Video shows a preparatory step / plan, motive, and absence of mistake; similar time/place/behavior supports non-propensity inference	Video is irrelevant to charged offense, at best shows propensity or would confuse jury; not a proper nonpropensity purpose	Admitted: video was sufficiently similar to be probative of a spurious plan and defendant’s mental state; conviction affirmed
Standard required for admitting spurious-plan evidence (degree of similarity / modus operandi)	Lower Wigmore-style similarity suffices where identity is not at issue and the evidence is used to prove plan/intent	If treated like modus operandi identity evidence, a heightened distinctive-similarity standard is required	Wigmore standard applies here (less stringent than modus operandi); similarity of time, place, and conduct met that test

State v. Turnidge, 359 Or 364 (2016) (articulates true-plan vs spurious-plan framework for other-acts evidence under OEC 404(3))
State v. Leistiko, 352 Or 172 (2012) (discusses Wigmore standard and limits on using prior acts to prove intent or plan)
State v. Brown, 217 Or App 330 (2007) (prior aborted attempt can support inference that later crime completed a planned course of conduct)
State v. Johnson, 340 Or 319 (2006) (distinguishes standards for proving intent vs identity; high similarity helpful but not always required for intent)
State v. Johnson, 313 Or 189 (1992) (requires very high similarity and distinctive methodology for modus operandi identity evidence)