State v. Tate
130 So. 3d 829
| La. | 2013Background
- Tate, who was 17 at the time of the offenses, was convicted of second-degree murder, attempted first-degree murder, and armed robbery in 1982 and sentenced to life without parole plus two 50-year terms; his conviction became final in 1984 when direct review concluded; Miller v. Alabama (2012) held mandatory LWOP for juvenile homicide offenders violates the Eighth Amendment and requires individualized sentencing consideration; Tate sought resentencing post-Miller; Louisiana courts differed on retroactivity, triggering a Teague-based retroactivity analysis; the Louisiana Supreme Court held Miller retroactivity did not apply in collateral review and that Miller is procedurally oriented; Legislature enacted Act 239 in 2013 to require parole consideration for juvenile homicide offenders, with Article 878.1 and 15:574.4(E)(1) creating new procedures and eligibility criteria; the issue is whether Miller and Act 239 apply retroactively to Tate; the court ultimately reinstated the district court’s judgment and reversed the court of appeals.
- The majority expressly holds Miller is a new criminal-constitutional-procedure rule that is not retroactive on collateral review, applying Teague’s two-step framework and determining Miller is procedural rather than substantive or watershed.
- The Court also holds Act 239 and related provisions apply prospectively, not to Tate’s pre-existing sentence, so they do not mandate resentencing or parole eligibility for Tate.
- Finally, the decision notes the dissents would have treated Miller as retroactive, and discusses related cases demonstrating a dispute among states regarding retroactivity in similar circumstances.
- The opinion discusses the Teague framework, the watershed exception, and the line of cases (Graham, Roper, Gideon, Summerlin, Ring, etc.) to classify Miller and evaluate retroactivity.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Retroactivity of Miller on collateral review | Tate: Miller should apply retroactively. | State: Miller is a new non-retroactive procedural rule. | Miller is not retroactive on collateral review. |
| Substantive vs procedural nature of Miller | Miller should be viewed as substantive. | Miller is procedural. | Miller is procedural, not watershed or substantive. |
| Retroactivity of 2013 Act 239 (Article 878.1, 15:574.4(E)(1)) | Act 239 should apply to Tate. | Act 239 applies prospectively. | Act 239 applies prospectively; does not apply to Tate. |
| Effect of Article 878.1 and 15:574.4(E)(1) on Tate | Tate should be eligible for parole consideration. | No retroactive parole procedure for Tate. | These provisions do not apply to Tate; no retroactive resentencing. |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010) (juvenile non-homicide LWOP ban supported by developmental considerations)
- Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (death penalty for juveniles unconstitutional under Eighth/Fourteenth Amendments)
- Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012) (mandatory LWOP for juveniles violates Eighth Amendment; requires individualized sentencing process)
- Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (two retroactivity exceptions for new rules on collateral review)
- Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (substantive vs procedural retroactivity framework; watershed rule limitation)
- Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (counsel for indigent defendants; watershed-like significance in retroactivity context)