129 So. 3d 1235
La. Ct. App.2013Background
- In 1986 Edward Martin was shot and killed; Robert Tassin was convicted of first‑degree murder in 1987 and sentenced to death; that conviction was later vacated on federal habeas review (E.D. La.) because a prosecution witness (Georgina Tassin) gave misleading testimony about plea inducements.
- After federal habeas relief and Fifth Circuit review, Tassin was re‑indicted for second‑degree murder and tried in 2010; a jury found him guilty and he was sentenced to life without benefit.
- Key eyewitnesses: survivor Wayne Stagner (wounded), Sheila Mills, Georgina Tassin (plea/cooperator). Physical evidence included the victim’s submerged car (recovered months later) and ballistics fragments; experts disputed shooting trajectories.
- Defense asserted theories including self‑defense and attacked witness credibility and prosecutorial conduct; repeated objections challenged the prosecutor’s tone and remarks, and sought exclusion or impeachment of Georgina Tassin.
- The trial court admitted Georgina Tassin’s testimony (she acknowledged charge reduction and that ten years was discussed), declined to give a self‑defense instruction, denied various motions (recusal, dismissal, exclusion of records), and refused some cross‑examination lines; appeal followed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (State) | Defendant's Argument (Tassin) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Denial of challenge for cause to venireman (Marsiglia) | Venireman could serve impartially; peremptory strike acceptable | Marsiglia was biased, contemptuous of the system; should have been excused for cause | Trial court did not abuse discretion; denial proper (defense used peremptory) |
| Refusal to give self‑defense jury instruction | No charge warranted absent evidence supporting self‑defense | Evidence (blood type transfer, scar, expert trajectory) supported instruction | No reasonable basis for self‑defense instruction; denial proper; any error harmless because defense argued theory to jury |
| Prosecutorial misconduct (remarks, attacks on defense) | Remarks were ill‑advised but not so prejudicial as to deny a fair trial given instructions and strong evidence | Prosecutor repeatedly denigrated defense and counsel, undermining fairness | Comments were improper/unprofessional but did not render trial unfair; no reversal |
| Misleading testimony / Giglio/Napue issues re: Georgina Tassin | Jury was informed of charge reduction and that ten years was a possibility and that she received ten years | Her testimony again understated promises; State failed to correct; prior Napue error persisted | The federal court’s prior relief remedied error by ordering retrial; at second trial jury was informed of material plea facts; no Napue/Giglio violation on retrial |
| Motion to exclude Georgina Tassin’s testimony at retrial | Allow testimony; cross‑examination permitted about plea terms | She should be excluded because her motives for testifying at retrial differed and prior misleading harmed fairness | Exclusion not warranted; new trial was proper remedy and cross‑examination sufficed |
| Cross‑examination limitation (prior arrests / "taking the fall") | Prior arrests not admissible to show bias; convictions and plea deal already before jury | Prior arrests showing Tassin’s pattern that husband took convictions to protect her was relevant to bias/motive | Trial court did not abuse discretion; arrests were not probative of bias and risked improper other‑crimes inference |
| Jury instruction re: Alford plea (Sheila Mills) | Jury instructed on assessing credibility; Alford instruction not necessary | Jury should have been instructed that Mills’ guilty plea may have been an Alford plea (no admission) and thus less probative of robbery plan | Court’s refusal harmless; Mills repeatedly testified she pled in her interest and the jury heard her explanations |
| Expert opinion allegedly expressing guilt (Col. Scanlan) | Expert testimony that no physical evidence supported self‑defense was proper factual opinion | Testimony impermissibly opined on defendant’s guilt in violation of art. 704 | Defendant failed to contemporaneously object; issue not preserved for appeal |
| Delay in prosecution / lost evidence | State acted without bad faith; retrial allowed; photos and transcripts preserved | 24‑year delay destroyed evidence (car), faded scar, lost witnesses — due process violation | No showing of bad faith or exceptional circumstances; delay did not deprive defendant of fair trial |
| Recusal of trial judge | No ground for recusal; judge had no role in prosecution of this case | Appearance of partiality because judge previously worked in DA’s office during post‑conviction matters | Recusal denial proper; prior writ denial and record show no actual involvement |
| Excessive sentence (life without benefits) | Statutory mandatory sentence; supported by facts | Tassin is "exceptional" and life sentence is excessive given history and time served | Sentence is mandatory and constitutional here; defendant failed to rebut presumption |
Key Cases Cited
- Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959) (prosecution must not allow false testimony to go uncorrected)
- Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (impeachment evidence or promises to witnesses must be disclosed)
- Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor must disclose favorable material evidence)
- Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988) (due process requires bad‑faith preservation failures for relief)
- North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970) (plea may be entered without admission of guilt)
- Jones v. Cain, 600 F.3d 527 (5th Cir. 2010) (habeas‑related standards on stopping state prosecution)
- State v. Juniors, 915 So.2d 291 (La. 2005) (hospital records exception strictly construed)
- State v. Mattheson, 407 So.2d 1150 (La. 1981) (defense witness immunity not recognized absent statute)
- State v. Lombard, 486 So.2d 106 (La. 1986) (rejecting defense witness immunity; addressing prosecutorial misconduct claim)
- State v. Seals, 83 So.3d 285 (La. App. 5 Cir.) (jury unanimity on alternative theories not required when instructed on alternatives)
